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1.0 Introduction and Methodology 
This paper is one of many contributions commissioned by the UNDP’s HDR report office. The objective 
of the paper is to examine the nature and extent of socio-economic dominance and exclusion in Africa, 
including efforts to redress inequities. The specific objectives are to develop a conceptual framework 
examining ethnic and racial socio-economic dominance in Africa; identify the historical and specifically 
colonial roots of ethnicity and socio-economic disparities; assess contemporary empirical patterns of 
socio-economic disparities along ethnic and racial lines, based upon key selected variables; analyze the 
strategies used to mobilize ethnicity and race towards the accumulation of power and economic 
resources; and to examine public policies and civic strategies aimed at redressing ethnic and racial 
resource imbalances. 
 
The study is based upon an assessment of existing secondary sources of empirical data and the literature 
on ethnic and racial economic dominance in Africa. It does not attempt to do primary empirical research. 
To examine the relationship between ethnic and racial identity, and socio-economic dominance, the 
second and third section of the paper identify existing ethnic and racial population groupings in Africa, 
both in terms of their historical (and colonial) construction and of their contemporary articulation. 
Although currently documented ethnographic categorizations are contested and changing in form, the 
study uses them with caution, bearing in mind that many ethnic categories were contrived in colonial 
and recent times, and that the ethnicisation of identity is a maturing phenomenon. 
 
The study of patterns and processes of socio-economic dominance and exclusion on the basis of ethnic 
and racial identity needs to be informed by the specific economic and social development patterns and 
contexts of various regions in the world. Variations in national levels of development, wealth and the 
predominance of particular economic activities, shape the context of and content of accumulation 
strategies and resources around which various ethnic or racial groupings compete. Because the African 
economy continues to depend on primary production (especially agriculture and mining) dominated by 
traditional exports with limited overall employment capacities in the secondary economic sectors, 
competition tends to be focused on the scarce education and employment opportunities, and for natural 
resources, primarily land. It is important to recognise the central role that land and natural resources 
distribution plays in sustaining basic livelihoods and its relatively critical role in struggles for political 
control and wealth. 
 
The methodology adopted to examine socio-economic dominance of the groupings is built around three 
interrelated pillars of analysis: historical sources of socio-economic dominance; contemporary empirical   2
patterns of socio-economic dominance and strategies used to gain dominance. Section 4 attempts to 
decipher patterns and processes of contemporary socio-economic dominance on ethnic grounds. Section 
5 surveys the strategies used by the state and, political and civic organizations to gain such dominance. 
Strategies used to mobilize socio-economic dominance which are examined include overtly political 
processes used to obtain and maintain political power as the key to preferential or discriminatory 
allocation of socio-economic resources, as well as other socio-economic processes which are mobilized 
to dominate access to education, employment, social services and national resources. Attempts to redress 
conflicts and imbalances which arise from ethnic and racial dominance are examined in brief in section 
6.  
2.0 Conceptualizing ethnicity and current ethnographic patterns 
This section discusses the overall conceptual framework of ethnicity and provides different perspectives 
of ethnicity in Africa. A broad definition of the ethnicity and race question and its understanding is 
presented. The section then provides a brief synthesis of the literature on the ethnic distribution and 
forms of conflicts that arise from these.  
2.1 Construction and fostering of ethnicity 
The literature reflects a variety of contested definitions of ethnicity in Africa. The family social 
formation in Africa has tended to be organized around groups of people claiming common ancestry, in 
terms of reproductive stock and language (Van Binsbergen, 1997). Thus according to Van Binsbergen: 
“An ethnic group is an explicitly named set of people, specific ethnic boundary markers, including ethno language, 
historic forms of leadership, modes of production, selected other cultural traits, sometimes also selected somatic 
characteristics such as skin color, hair texture, facial characteristics, deliberate human interference with the body’s 
appearance- both reversible (e.g. scarification).” 
Members of a “tribe” were seldom members of the same political unit and very seldom indeed did they 
all share common social purposes in terms of activities of the members of different ethnic communities. 
But ethnicity is in reality socially constructed and political mobilized as has been observed. “However 
the key concept of ethnicity revolves on how the wider social field is economically, politically and 
culturally structured in terms of a multiplicity of such ethnic groups in interaction. Any one of the fields 
can be mobilized into developed forms of advocacy, in which the notion of ethnicity also implies some 
form of “identity or self image, which members of any social category construct on the basis of 
identification and stereotyping both among themselves and among outsiders” (Ibid). 
  
Moreover critical ethnicity is a dynamic and transforming process:  
“Identity tends to be situational, multiple (since every social field consists of many intersecting social categories), 
strategic and subject to historical change. This applies to various identities including gender, class, professional, 
religious, and other identities. Socializing early in life, as well as social control, propaganda, taking consciousness   3
later on, may cause a specific identity to become so deeply entrenched in the personality as to produce a fixed, self-
evident vision of reality, no longer consciously negotiated in social contexts” (Ibid).  
 
Thus ethnicization is a process in which ethnic identity is mobilized into a militant political idiom taking 
precedence over an individual’s other identities, and thus becomes a basis for political action. Yet the 
literature has tended to treat ethnicity as organic and primordial. For decades, the notion of ethnic 
(tribal) difference dominated most attempts to explain violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. By 
pairing the rich spectrum of ethnic diversity found in the continent with the culture of competition 
induced by a harsh environment and restricted access to natural and social resources, ethnic violence 
came to be regarded as the natural state of affairs (Fukui and Turton, 1979 cited by Osaghae, 1998). In 
this view, ethnic conflict is part of the historical baggage that modernizing states have been saddled 
with, as both product and indicator of the cultural conservatism and traditionalism found among the rural 
population. 
This standard interpretation of African ethnicity as primordial hangover attracted criticism from 
anthropologists since the 1960s who question assumptions about ethnicity as a quasi-ontological base of 
human identity, with reference to such phenomena as cultural conversion, situational identity, the 
uneven distribution of cultural properties and the invention of tradition (Barth, 1969 cited by Osaghae, 
1998; Ranger and Hobsbawm, 1983; Holy, 1973 cited by Osaghae, 1998; Eriksen, 1993 cited by 
Osaghae, 1998). Ethnicity, far from presenting a historical leftover, has been recast as a modern 
phenomenon, with people re-tribalising
 in the face of pressure, so that ethnicity is no longer seen as a 
cause, but rather as a consequence of war, (Fukui and Markakis, 1994; Gurrand Harff, 1994 cited by 
Osaghae, 1998). However, with the passage of time an inversion of ethnicity from being an effect into 
being a cause is indeed possible (Osaghae, 1998). 
Ethnicity connotes a group’s antipathy against others, including suspicion, hatred and envy. It is not a 
neutral concept merely depicting and signifying the act of inter ethnic relations that are expected to take 
place in a multi-ethnic society. “To speak of ethnicity is to speak of inter-group interactive situations 
characterized by rivalry, competition and often conflict”. Tribalism is a “special” relationship, one in 
which people identify other exploited people as the source of their insecurity and frustration rather than 
their common exploiters, (Ley, 1975 cited by Osaghae, 1998). Some have characterised ethnicity as an 
urban phenomenon as opposed to tribalism viewed as a rural one (Ley, 1971 cited by Osaghae, 1998). 
Ethnicity can be structured by settlerism or immigrancy (Americo-Liberians) or state policy such as in 
South Africa, through the former governing and independent states where the mindset was 
geographically demarcated (Osaghae, 1998).    4
The ethnic situation of a country refers to the number and character of ethnic groups, the conflict among 
them, as well as their class regional, racial, religious or other correlates which serve to reinforce these 
conflicts. It can be implied that from the above discussion definition that pure ethnicity is rare. 
2.2 Ethnographic categorization in Africa 
Notwithstanding the conceptual contestations of ethnicity, extensive reference to ethnic groups and, 
official and informal categorization of ethnic groups is replete in the literature and in practice. There are 
over 600 ethnic groups in Africa (Table 2-1), and the number of ethnic groups per country ranges from 1 
to 250. The countries with the largest number of ethnic groups are the DRC, Ghana, Kenya, and Ivory 
Coast, while those with the least are Lesotho, Swaziland and Rwanda. 
 
The migration patterns influenced ethnic composition, largely because colonial/post colonial boundaries 
tended to containerize ethnic groups within boundaries, where such geographic fixation of ethnicity did 
not exist. Ghana for instance consists of both autochthonous and migrant peoples (Osei-Kwamw, 1980 
cited by Twagiramutara, 1998; Agyeman, 1987 cited by Twagiramutara,1998), The Guan are said to be 
autochthonous. The Ewes are known to have migrated from the east through Dahomey (Benin) to Togo 
and from Togo to Ghana. The Ga-Adangbe too are said to have migrated westward from the east. The 
rest namely the Asante, Brong, Denkyira and the Northern ethnic groups migrated southward from the 
Sahara Desert, probably somewhere north of the desert town of Gao (Agyman, 1998).  
 
Ethnicity has tended to be accentuated, such as in the case of the Tutsis, the Hutus and the Twa, through 
missionary ethnography which dwelt on physical difference. Father Menard (1907-08:22) cited by 
Twagiramutara, (1998) wrote: 
“The Batutsi race is undoubtedly one of the most handsome and interesting races of equatorial Africa. Physically, 
the Mututsi are perfectly built .Their physique is more like that of the Whites than that of Negroes to the extent that 
one could say without exaggeration that they are Europeans in black skin. Ryckmans described the Tutsi as 
reminiscent of the physique of the mummy of Ramses ll”   
 
Yet socially and economically, ethnicity is perceived through the fact that the Tutsi dominated the Hutu. 
(Louis, 1963 cited by Twagiramutara, 1998), and the Tutsi who owned large herds of cattle were the 
more ‘Lords’ who had enslaved the Hutu who were more of agriculturists.  
 
Ethnicity has for long been contested around the fact of minority settler dominance  such as in the cases 
of Sierra Leone and Liberia where repatriated freed black slaves (creoles) who constitute less than 10% 
of population as well as post colonial migrations of different races. Thus Sierra Leone the indigenous 
population is made up of 18 ethnic groups, with the Temne in the north and the Mende in the South    5
Table 2.1: Populations of selected by ethnic groups 







Dominant Ethnic Groups  Minority Group 
       1
st   2
nd   3
rd    




Bakongo 13%  Other 







Burundi  6,096,156  27,830  3  Hutu  85 %  Tutsi 14%  Twa 1%    




Kindi (11%)  Others 
Chad 7  million  1,284,000  200  Arabs  Gorane  Zaghawa  Others 
Congo   2,785,000  342,000    Kongos 
51.5% 
Tekes 17.3%  Mboshis 11.5%  Other  
Cote 
d’Ivoire 







DRC (Zaire)  49,139,000  2,345,000  250  Luba 18%  Mongo 17%  Kongo 12%   
Ethiopia  63 million  1,104,000  10  Oromo 40%  Amhara  and 
Tigre 32% 
Bakongo 13%  European 1% 




Saho 3%  Other 3% 























Lesotho 2  million  30,350  4  Sotho  99.7%  Europeans  Asians  Others 
Liberia 3,317,176  111,370  18 Indigenous 
African 







Malawi 11  million  118,000  3  11  Nyanja  Tumbuka  Chewa 
Mali 11,626,219  1.24 
million 
6  Mande 50%  Peul 17%  Voltaic 12%  Other 






Indians 0.008%  Europeans 
0.06% 
Namibia  2 million  824,290  9  Ovambo  Karanga  Herero  White Europeans 






Et ebira  
(1%) 
Rwanda  8 million    6  Hutu 84%  Tutsi 15%  Twa (Pygmy) 1%   
Sierra Leone  5 million    18  Temne  Mende  Krios  other 
Somalia  2,673,000  637 660  6  Somali 85%  Bantu   Arabs   







Sudan  38,114,160  2,505,810  5  Black 52%  Arab 39%  Beja 6%  Other 
Swaziland   17,200   African 97%  European 3%     
Tanzania 33  million  945,090    Bantu  99%       
Uganda  21 million    15  Baganda  Ankole  Basoga  other  
Zambia 10  million  752,610  15  Bemba 







Zimbabwe  12 million  390,580  6  Shona 71 %  Ndebele 16 %  Other 11%  Mixed and Asian 
1 % 
Source: (Ethno-Net Africa Database 2003; CIA World Factbook, 1995)   6
being the largest by far, while the immigrants comprise about 60,000 Krios and about 4,000 Lebanese, 
500 Indians, and 2,000 Europeans. The immigrants are considered economically dominant, and the 
fulcrum of political contestations (Sepdata, 2002). 
 
2.3 Race in Africa 
Various sub-Saharan countries have a variety of races including the four major groupings: blacks, 
whites, Arabs and Asians (Table 2-2). While 15 countries have significantly racial mixes in their 
populations, only 6 countries have substantial non-black race populations. However many of the 
countries (10) have substantial populations of mixed race blood, referred to variously as “metis”, 
“coloured” and “obrownie.” 
 
The Arab content of race distribution varies from north to south of sub-Saharan Africa, wherein race and 
ethnicity interfaces are perceived in both biological and social constructions. For example in Sudan race 
concepts based on “Arab” content have been elaborated. `Thus, Ibrahim (1984) cited by Suliman, 
(1997), distinguishes between four groups using a more culture-oriented classification: 
“… the Arabs, the fully Arabised, the partly Arabised, and the non-Arabised. The Arabs, according to him, are the 
native Arabic speakers: the Rezeigat, the Zeiydiya, Beni Hussein, and the Djawama nomads who, as a result of 
intermarriage with the indigenous Darfurians, look much darker than non-Sudanese Arabs. The fully Arabised group 
refers to those locals who have lost their native languages to Arabic. The Berti and the Tungur belong to this group. 
The third group - the partly Arabised - consists of those who have retained their native languages, but also speak 
Arabic fluently. Among these the author lists the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Meidob. The last group in this 
classification is the non-Arabised tribes who speak very little Arabic, for example, the Massalit, some sections of the 
Zaghawa, the Bergid, the Mima, the Tama, and the Kenana.”  
 
O'Fahey (1980) cited by Suliman, (1997) however challenges this ethnographic classification of the 
Arab/non-Arab divide as being ambiguous and rendering the genealogical approach unworkable. The 
structure suggested by O'Fahey relates migration, linguistic and occupational factors in identifying the 
ethnic structure of Darfur. In this approach he identifies, the first group as nomadic camel and cattle 
herders, who identify themselves as Arabs, with nomadic self-esteem and, a feeling of superiority. For 
them, the second group, sedentary farmers and other rural groups are perceived as inferior, not only 
ethnically but also culturally by virtue of occupation, and considered to be “kitchen” based. Like their 
European counterparts, these herder/soldier groups neither refrained nor disdained from raiding and 
robbing the despised farmers, especially in times of scarcity. Armed raids against other groups, mainly 
in rich agricultural areas, constitute an important anti-destitute strategy in times of major natural 
calamities.  
   7
Although traditionally inclined to peaceful life, the Fur sedentary farmers are often engaged in 
skirmishes with cattle and camel nomads over animal intrusion in their farms. As a result of these 
frequent clashes and in spite of economic interdependence and cooperation, both groups harbour a 
degree of mutual animosity and mistrust.  
Table 2.2: Population of selected Sub Sahara African Countries by Race  
% of Population  Country   Population 
Whites Asians African  Coloureds 
Angola 10,069,501  1  22  75  2 
Botswana 1,392,414 1    99   
Burundi 6,262,429  0.05  0.0003  99.95   
Cameroon 13,521,000  <1  86  13 
Chad 5,586,505  <2.69  97.3   
Congo 
Republic 
2,504,996 0.34  2.66  97  
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
14,791,257 12.72  87.28   
DRC 44,060,636      100   
Eritrea          
Ethiopia 55,979,018  1  99   
Gabon 1,155,749  8.65  91.4   
Ghana 17,763,138  0.2  99.8   
Kenya 28,817,227  1  84  15 
Lesotho 1,992,960  0.08  0.04  99.7   
Liberia 3,073,245      95  5 
Malawi 9,808,384      97.5%  2.5% 
Mali   9,375,132  5  95   
Mozambique 18,115,250  0.06  0.08  99.7  0.19 
Mauritius 1,127,068       100 
Namibia 1,651,545  6.6    86  7.4 
Nigeria 101,232,251  0.24  64.8  35 
Rwanda 8,605,307      100   
Sierra Leone  4,753,120  1  99   
Somalia 7,347,554    15  85   
South Africa  45,095,459  13.6  2.6  75.2  8.6 
Sudan          
Swaziland          
Tanzania 28,701,077  1  99   
Uganda 19,573,262  1  76  23 
Zambia 9,445,723  1.1    98.7  0.2 
Zimbabwe 11,139,961 1%  <1%  98%  <1% 
Source (Ethno-Net Africa Database; CIA World Factbook, 1995) 
 
To these two groups is added a third culture area/occupational group which consists of traders, 
government officials, absentee landlords and urban-based professionals. Unlike the other two groups 
who have limited political influence, this third group plays an important role in the political life of the 
region.  
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As Abdul-Galil (1984) cited by Suliman, (1997) notes, ethnic identification along the four criteria of 
territory, linguistics, occupation and genealogy is a situational phenomenon, and that even the 
apparently solid ethnic boundaries of the dominant tribal entities of the Fur, the Arab and the Zaghawa 
were in actual fact porous and responsive to change. However, with the escalation of the conflict, the 
ethnic divide began to harden as people became more aware of their ethnic affiliation, and their former 
political party and religious sect loyalty began to wither away (Suliman, 1997). 
2.4 Religious affiliation 
Religious affiliation in sub-Saharan Africa has also tended to be a source of division, socio-economic 
dominance and conflicts. There are generally 3 predominant groups of religions: Catholics, Protestants 
are newer Christian groups, Muslims and the more organic African religious systems (Table 2-3). While  
the data is weak, the trend of religious affiliation is dominated by Christianity, although most Africans 
practice both their indigenous religions alongside the “imported” religions.   
3.0 Role of colonial powers in constructing ethnic identity and conflict 
Contemporary patterns and processes of socio-economic dominance along ethnic and racial grounds are 
partly derived from the legacy of colonial divide and rule policies based upon ethnic identity creation 
and unequal resource distributions. These have in some cases led to long term conflict. 
 
But this is not to suggest that ethnicisation does not precede colonialisation. For example, “the Luvale, 
Lunda, Luchazi and Mbunda-speaking peoples of the Upper Zambezi area certainly had a developed 
ethnic self-awareness prior to either their contact with mercantile capital through participation in the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade in the early nineteenth century, or their experience as colonized peoples 
between 1906 and 1964. What changed so dramatically from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was 
that a previously slowly evolving, fluid ethnic self-awareness was transformed into a new, harder 'tribal' 
structure to the extent that 'tribalism' was stronger and more politically relevant in 1981 than it was in 
1881” (Papstein, 1989). Various processes fomented this. Missionaries of the fundamentalist Christian 
Mission in Marylands (Plymouth Brethren) were of critical importance in the development of tribalism 
amongst the Luvale and Lunda. Labour migrancy gave the Luvale and Lunda their first urban 
experience, and those who migrated to the Copperbelt were shocked to learn that they were regarded as 
social inferiors by the more numerous Bemba and, of course, the Lozi. The Balovale people spoke 
unfamiliar and difficult languages. 
   9
Colonial administrations universally created administrative and political districts around tribal 
chiefdoms, which in many cases contrived regional centres of ethnically based chief authority of groups 
which were in fact autonomous. In Zambia for example, the MacDonnel Commission testimonies to the 
Commission and who, in the preparation of masses in the 1930’s was set “…. to demonstrate the 
separate and independent origins and development of the Lunda and Luvale tribes and their autonomy 
from the Lozi … It sustained both Luvale and Lunda claims to autonomy and the government responded 
by creating Balovale District and separate Luvale and Lunda Native Authorities. As the Luvale and 
Lunda saw it, they had saved themselves from Lozi over lordship after a generation of struggle” (Ibid). 
Table 2.3: Populations of selected countries by religious groups [incomplete] 
Religious groups  Country   Population 




Angola 10,766,471   38%  15%  47%     
Botswana  1,573,267  15%     85%    
Burundi  6,096,156   62% 5%  23% 10%   
Cameroon  15  million           
Chad 7  million           
Congo 
Republic 
2,785,000           
Cote  d’Ivoire  14,292,000   22%  5.5%  17% 38%  17% 
DRC 49,139,000    40%  35%  10%  9%   
Ethiopia  63  million           
Eritrea  4  million           
Gabon 1,167,000  12.1%  65.2%  18.8%  2.9%  0.8%   
Gabon  19,162,000           
Ghana  30,8 million  ~63% (Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, 
Presbyterians) 
>20% ~16%   
Kenya 2  million  66%     26%  6%   
Lesotho  3,317,176           
Liberia 11  million  40%     40%  20%   
Malawi             
Mali 11,626,219 1%     9%  90%   
Mauritius  17  million           
Mozambique  2  million           
Namibia  106,409,000           
Nigeria  8 million   About 30%  10%    5%  About 50%   
Rwanda  5  million           
Sierra  Leone  2,673,000           
Somalia  42  million           
South  Africa  38,114,160           
Sudan   5%      25%  70  %   
Swaziland  33  million           
Tanzania  21  million           
Uganda  10  million           




32% 27%  31%  1%  Atheist/non-
religious 
0.5% 
Zimbabwe 10,766,471  25%      24%  1%  50% 
synertretic 
Source: Ethno Net Database, 2003; CIA World Factbook, 1995   10
The creation of Native Authorities, which gave in theory but rarely in practice the “tribes” a “modern” 
administrative structure, was moderately useful in carrying out indirect rule. Yet the term coined was 
something of a misnomer; perhaps 'Native Responsibilities' would be more descriptive of their functions 
as they never had serious authority in making policy. “… their creation encouraged, or indeed forced, 
people to seek solutions to local problems through the newly formulated tribal structure” (Ibid).  
 
Ethnic politics was also fomented when colonial governments pronounced that government-sponsored 
primary school education should teach in local languages. Over time tribalism in such native authorities 
matured through various mechanisms: for instance, the 
 “… Lunda boycotted Luvale traders and vice versa. Travel in one another's territory was unsafe … Couples who 
had married across ethnic lines found themselves ridiculed by both sides and, at times, even forced by their families 
to divorce” (Ibid). 
3.1 Identity construction and ethnicity under colonialism 
According to (Twagiramutara, 1998), the establishment of the colonial state in Africa generally 
enhanced the ethnicisation of politics and administration, in terms of ethnic belonging gradually 
eclipsing clanic identity as the main basis for the social and administrative identification of peoples. For 
example, during 1926-1929, the colonial state was preoccupied with the systematic classification of the 
various social and ethnic groups living in Rwanda in a manner that aligned them to their perceived 
ethnic category of the Bantou, Hamite and Pygmy races, and their functional utility with the colonial 
state, and to shape their desired power structures (Twagiramutara, 1998).  
 
 The elimination by the Belgian colonial administration and by the missionaries of the last Hutu chiefs 
and auxiliary chiefs from their posts, functions and their influence, in the newly conquered regions and 
their replacement by ruling social fractions recruited and selected on the basis of criteria including that 
of being Tutsi familihood, lineage and ethnicity led to the abrogation of merit and, competence in 
appointments and recognition. This practice significantly led to the belief in the practice of exclusion 
and rejection meted against the Hutu and the Twa ethnic categories and fostered the emergence of an 
ethnic-based class awareness (Ibid).  
 
Specifically ethnic administration practices were based in colonial policies, which required all natives to 
carry identity cards and taxpaying booklets, bearing references to their ethnic group, and during the 
1930, and 1952 population censuses, ethnic classification was attended by a socially unchanging 
identity. But spurious methods were used to define ethnicity in Rwanda: for example,    11
“Whoever, at the time owned at least ten heads of cattle was automatically identified in his taxpayer’s booklet as 
Tutsi. Whosoever owned no cattle was tagged and labelled as belonging to the Hutu ethnic group” (Ibid). 
 
However, colonial ethnic fostering policy was contradictory and changing opportunistically, for example 
in Rwanda during 1962 to 1973 there was a complete change of ethnic policies by the colonial 
administration and church due to the intervention of Colonel Logiest, the Special Resident who changed 
the colonial policy of traditional alliances preferred by the Belgians and the power balance between the 
local protagonists. He dethroned various Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs for various reasons and 
systematically replaced them with Hutus in key political and administrative posts and other functions of 
influence. This laid the basis for the coup d’e’tat (Hattier, 1988) cited by Twagiramutara (1998), which 
brought the Hutu to power and established republican institutions. Ethnicism was then systematically 
maintained as a means of controlling the opposition and the conflicts that emerged among social actors 
with multiple and diverse interests derived from the regime in power and those that saw themselves as 
disadvantaged by various mechanisms and, practices used to control the differential distribution of 
authority in the political and/or economic spheres. 
 
Similarly when the British destroyed the Asante imperial power by 1902, using superior arms and a 
large army recruited from among the coastal ethnic groups in Ghana (Agyeman, 1993), this exacerbated 
inter-ethnic hostilities between the coastal people and the people inland, wherein the Asante allied 
themselves with the peoples who now occupy Northern Ghana who were equally fearful of British 
colonial domination (Ibid). 
 
Colonial state formation was a process which attempted to forge nations from a conglomeration of 
diverse ethnic groups some of which were decided unwillingly partners in the union (Agyeman, 1998). 
But this was resisted and created a framework for ethnic tensions. For instance, in 1956, the people of 
British Togoland, the Ewes refused in a referendum supervised by the United Nations to join Ghana (the 
then Gold Coast) and preferred to continue as a British Trusteeship, although other ethnic groups in the 
area approved the inclusion of British Togoland into Ghana. From then on, the Ewes made several 
attempts to secede from Ghana and form a united Ewe state which embraces all Ewes in British and 
French Togoland (Ibid). 
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Colonial land alienation processes fractured pre-colonial economies and inter-ethnic relations. In Kenya, 
the Bantu speaking Luhya and Kisii and the Nilotic speaker who had mixed economies, pursed trading 
strategies which linked them to the Maasai in a regional system, with the ethnic relations that were 
mutually beneficial and helped to neutralize potential rivalry and conflict. Colonial policies created a 
common politico- administrative centre, which had the effect of bringing together all “tribes” under one 
authority but saw the division of the state into ethnic administrative enclaves, and the confinement of the 
“natives” to their reserves. The colonial alienation of land in Nakuru, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Uasin Gishu 
and Trans- Nozia in what was traditionally Maasiland robbed the Maasi of grazing land thereby 
constraining their economic activities. Large scale land alienation in Kikuyuland engendered squatter 
farming among the Kikuyu, especially in white settled areas in the Rift Valley. By 1918, 10% of the 
Kikuyu had become squatters. The Anti-Kikuyu crusade between the Kalenjin and the Maasai in 
contemporary Kenya has to be explained largely by this colonial heritage (Oyugi, 1998). 
 
In Burundi the colonial resident governor Ryckmans recruited local collaborators among the Tutsi chiefs 
in 1932 arguing that the Batutsi were born to rule, that their mere appearance gave them considerable 
prestige over the inferior races that surrounded them, and their qualities and even their flaw dignify them 
even more (Ryckmans, 1933 cited by Twagiramutara, 1998). Thus power struggles under Belgian 
trusteeship were not merely between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups as was the case in Rwanda, but 
between groups of princes (Ganwa) and those most identified both with the royal tradition and popular 
sentiment (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). 
 
Contemporary ethnic conflicts in Africa therefore arise from a crisis of legitimacy of the state, its 
institutions and their political incumbents, which resulted from the way the African state was 
constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing differences, 
administrative policies of divide and rule and economic policies that further fractured the colonial entity. 
These policies in Uganda not only undermined the legitimacy of the state, but also impeded the 
emergence of nationalism and generated ethnic, religious and regional divisions that were to contribute 
in later years to instability and political violence (Otunnu and Laloyo).  
In colonial times, another significant source of division in Africa was the manipulation of religious 
affiliation since the arrival of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism. In Uganda for instance, these 
religious groups engaged in ferocious conflicts for dominance, and the Protestant faction emerged 
victorious after the Imperial British East Africa Company intervened in their favour. Anglicans were too   13
late to dominate the top positions in the civil service, and this structural inequality was maintained after 
the colonial era. Thus religious beliefs and political party affiliations became entangled (Ibid). 
Religious and ethnic coincidences were manipulated during the various colonial processes which sought 
hegemony using these differences. In the Sudan for example, the Mahdi declared a jihad and set out to 
spread Islam not only in the north but also as in the south, aggravating southern tribes who were mainly 
animist and did not embrace Islam. Consequently, the southern tribes supported the British against the 
Mahdists in the battle of Omdurman in 1898. In 1899 Britain and Egypt established a joint 
condominium regime as part of an effort to divide the north from strengthened south. The southern 
region also promulgated a ‘Permit to Trade Order’ which sought to exclude the Egyptian, northern 
Sudanese and other Muslims from trading in and with the southerners, but encouraged southerner’s to 
trade with the East Africans and Christian traders from Greece and Syria. In 1947, the British proposed a 
legislative assembly to unify the north and the south, based on the perception of an absence of political 
structures in the south and the need to secure the rights of the south to manage their affairs and 
resources. Similarly, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1953 that granted self-government to Sudan did 
not include participation by the south. Marginalization of the south in the independence process thus 
continued (Suliman, 1997). 
 
Ethnic conflicts in the Ugandan colonial state were also exacerbated by the partition of the country into 
economic zones. For example, while a large portion of the territory south of Lake Kyoga was designated 
as cash crop growing and industrial zones, the territory north of Lake Kyoga was designated as a labour 
reserve. This partition, which was not dictated by development potentials, led to economic disparities 
between the south and the north. The fragmentation of the society was compounded by the economic-
cum-administrative policy that left the civil service largely in the hands of Baganda and the army largely 
in the hands of the Acholi and other northern ethnic groups. These policies also widened the gulf 
between the socio-political south and the socio-political north. This was further sustained by the 
administrative policy that relied on the Baganda as colonial agents in other parts of the country. The 
policy of divide and rule, which rested on so-called ‘indirect rule’, led to widespread anti-Buganda 
sentiment (Otunnu and Laloyo). 
 
In general the ethnic policy of the colonial administration, consisted of assigning groups to territories 
within rigid borders, on the basis of the so called ethnic-maps; accentuating cleavages and other minor 
differences between various cultural entities, and creating antagonism between the African communities   14
of diverse origins (Ibid) just as between the indigenous and the recent arrivals, agents or otherwise of the 
colonial administration.  
 
Colonial authorities in Africa resisted in many instances the introduction of lingua francae based on 
given dominant languages as they feared this would counter their divide and rule tactic. For example in 
Malawi, in 1918 an ideological core of history and chiefly authority, partially coalesced into a regional 
movement that was defined administration's junior officers resurrected the old idea that Nyanja should 
be made the official language of the country and taught in all its schools.  
“…. since ... Nyanja, or its dialectal variants, Mang'anja and Chewa, were spoken by a majority of the country's 
people …… governor, Sir George Smith, rejected this because it would tend to merge the various tribes in the 
Protectorate at a greater rate than at present, and this was undesirable. One of the chief safeguards against any 
combined rising is the individualism of the various tribes, and with a small and scattered white population. Instead: 
… The north, the language that was granted official status was Tumbuka, and school texts issued were in the 
Tumbuka language, even though, for the Ngoni, it was their adopted language (Vail and White, 1989). 
One critical area of colonial fostering of ethnic and race identity and conflict arose from the emergence 
of mixed race Africans, whose attributes were manipulated by white settlers and immigrants.  
“For over a hundred years attempts have been made to engineer socially a Coloured political alliance with the ruling 
white parties. For instance, the Constitutional proposals which South African whites adopted in 1983 attempted to 
reconstitute a distinct 'Coloured' identity in South Africa, fuelling intense ideological and political conflict over the 
content of Coloured identity. Attempts by the state and ruling class in South Africa to sponsor the development of a 
client Coloured class have their origin in the endeavours of the colonial administrations to deflect opposition based 
on mass resistance by the colonized people” (Goldin, 1989). 
3.2 Colonial legacy: Indirect rule and settlerism  
In some countries physical spatial re-ordering of villages and family was used by the colonialists to 
consolidate ethnic power structures of their choice, and a framework within which taxes could be 
collected, migration regulated and supported land allocation strategies which suited their interests. In 
Malawi for example, during the 1910 period, 
 “…. 'Villages' for Yao headmen had to be created from the ethnic soup ... [this because]… houses were 'scattered in twos 
and threes all about the place', making it difficult to collect taxes and to keep good order generally. The British ordered that 
houses be 'concentrated' into groups of no fewer than twenty. Many thousands of people had to be relocated, and it was 
impossible to join four adjacent settlements and appoint a headman without political trouble. The majority of those most 
directly affected by hut concentration were Nguru, for the power of the newly appointed Yao village headmen to allocate 
land put all immigrants firmly in their power.” (Vail and White, 1989). 
 
Chiefly control over land effectively made Nguru labour available to the Yao chiefs and headmen on 
akapolo ('slave') terms, just as it had been made available to the European planters through the thangata 
system. This government-sponsored political differentiation between Yao chiefs and Nguru commoners 
also had a clear economic parallel. By April 1916, exactly one year after village consolidation had 
begun; tobacco was being cultivated as a cash crop (Vail and White, 1989).  
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Without schools to propagate notions of ethnic identity among the young at the village level, ethnic 
ideologies remained weak, largely restricted to the chiefly elite and their supporters and possessing little 
popular force. Yet colonial education in mission schools fomented resistance to these colonial policies, 
among the educated, who felt they were blocked from opportunities, which their education had prepared 
them for, and they demanded the rapid Africanization of the bureaucracy to pay-off the years of 
educational investment (Ibid). However, in Malawi for example, the majority of people in the south used 
politics to end the hated thangata system (forced labour) and unequal access to land. 
 
As we discuss later these colonial ethnic policies and the evolution of political and socio-economic 
dominance by some races and ethnic groups, was reinforced and exacerbated during the post colonial 
era, leading to extreme cases of conflict, notably included Kenya, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Angola, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe. Namibia and South Africa where anti-colonial armed conflict was intense. 
4.0 Identity and socio-economic dominance: Trends and strategies 
This section identifies the way in which dominant ethnic groups organize themselves and mobilize 
identity towards accumulating power and resources. It assesses the strategies used to gain and defend 
dominance while maintaining the marginalisation and acquiescence of the weaker groups. The various 
dimensions used to mobilize dominance include gaining state power, resource accumulation and 
external frameworks of resource and power building. The chapter assesses the existing literature to 
examine how ethnic and racial mobilization has been undertaken in a selected group of case study 
countries, focusing on the accumulation of power and socio-economic resources.  
 
The analysis is shaped by our view that the African state has played an important role in shaping 
“primitive accumulation” in general and access to socio-economic resources in particular, and that 
access to political power is key to dominance given the prior absence of an existing bourgeoisie less 
dependent on state resources. Such a view of the state is situated within the context of colonial and neo-
colonial class formation processes and extroverted economic structures. The role of internal and external 
sources of power and resource accumulation will thus also be treated brief as essential to our attempt to 
explain processes of building socio-economic dominance. 
 
Effort was made to present and analyze the patterns of selected resource distributions within sub-
Saharan Africa so as to explore their co-incidence with ethnicity and race using data collated from 
numerous sources. Such data included: resource and power differential indices, critical to socio-
economic dominance, such as land and natural resource endowments/allocations, employment and   16
educational status and political position. Numerous sources of data on these indicators of ethnic and race 
shares of socio-economic resources were sought, but data tends to be incomplete for many countries and 
inconsistencies abound, and most data is not systematically disaggregated on ethnic or race lines. 
Scattered references to the resource dominance of particular ethnic groups are found in varied sources, 
and these are collated and used to discern patterns of dominance. This suggests that only a few case 
studies of extreme cases of ethnic/race political and socio-economic dominance, and related conflicts 
can be used (for now) to develop the core arguments of this paper. 
4.1 Strategies for accumulation of power 
The strategies used in Africa over time to mobilise state power as a tool of patronage or resource 
allocation for socio-economic dominance, or to countervail this have been varied and changing. In many 
cases a combination of these were used overtime. These range from the creation of one party systems, 
contrived mult-partyism, federalism or provincialism, military rule, regional associations of various 
focus, and direct violence to eliminate opponents. Some case examples of this are discussed below.  
 
For about four decades since the 1950’s, the predominant political framework which was utilized in 
Africa to mobilize the concentration of power on ethnic lines, as well as in some cases to create scope 
for ethnic balancing, was the de facto and de jure creation of the one party political system. Most 
countries adopted this approach, while a few used variants of it, such as the “no party” system (e.g. 
Uganda, Swaziland), or the military regime which is somewhat of a no political organisation system. 
One of the pioneers in these trends was Ghana, where:  
“… Kwame Nkrumah and his party Convention Peoples Party Government … discouraged ethnic and regional party 
politics in favour of national integration and nationalism mainly through the strategy of one party state governance 
from 1964 (Agyman, 1998).  
This approach however could not contain ethnic politics, even though the distribution of cabinet 
positions between 1952 and 1965 had produced a fair balance of ethnic representation in the national 
political leadership (Table 4-1). Instead the Asante and Ewe leadership accused Nkrumah of being 
“tribalistic” and demanded either federalism (the Asante) or Secession (Agyman, 1998). 
Table 4-1: Ethnic Composition of Nkrumah’s Cabinet: 1952-1965 
 
Fanti Nzima  Ashanti 
Other 
Akans Ewe  Ga  Guan 
North 
groups 
1952 1  1  1  0  1  2  2  1 
1954 2  1  2  1  1  1  1  1 
1956 2  2  2  2  1  1  1  2 
1965 2  3  3  3  0  1  2  3 
Source: Smock D. Rand Smock A.C, 1974, The Politics of Pluralism: Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana, Elsevier    17
The dismantling of regional assemblies which Nkrumah saw as fostering ethnic conflicts, was intended 
to compel national integration, but instead led to Nkrumah`s overthrow in 1966 by the military. This 
brought an alliance of the Ewes and Akans into power, leading to a cycle of ethnic competition for state 
power through the military, based on further coups and counter coups. For instance:  
“the Ewe/Akan alliance in the military collapsed when General Kotoka, an Ewe in the military regime was killed in 
a coup led by young Akan officers, paving the way for Ashante hegemony through Lt. General Afrifa who headed 
the regime until 1969, leading to election of an Ashanti/Brong Ahafo based political party led by Busia. In practice 
the creation of an overtly ethnically based government led to significantly increased ethnic animosity between 
Akans (especially Ashanti/Brong Ahafo) on the one hand and Ewes on the other. Thus the NAL the opposition party 
workers and supporters, who invariably were Ewes, in the Akan areas were regularly harassed” (Agyman, 1998).  
According to Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor, (1990),  
“This was the first time the political divide had surfaced on rigid lines of ethnic origin”  
and consequently, whatever ideological differences or similarities existed between the parties before, 
now became blurred and submerged in the ethnic divide (Ibid). 
 
In the case of Ivory Coast, the ruling party (PDCI) used  
“... ethnicity to consolidate its base and foundation, [although] there was no explicit and official ethnic policy [the] 
political discourse and ... composition of political institutions shows that ethnicity has been critical, and [as] the 
composition off the government since about 1980 seems to be guided by the concern for ethnic and regional 
balance” (Goninn, 1998). 
 
Given that the post-colonial regime inherited in Africa has tended to be a fractured state, various 
attempts have been made to build inter-party alliances as a means of manipulating power. In Uganda at 
independence for instance Milton Obote responded to this crisis of legitimacy by forming an alliance 
between his political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Buganda monarchy party 
(Kabaka Yekka), with him becoming the Executive Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II as the 
President and Head of State (Otunnu and Laloyo). However, the alliance collapsed over a conflict over 
land (the ‘lost counties’) between the Bunyoro and Buganda, and thus led to widespread violence in 
Buganda, the detention of five government ministers from the Bantu region, dismissal of the President 
and Vice President, the exiling of Mutesa and suspension of the 1962 constitution and the imposition of 
a state of emergency in Buganda, etc (Ibid). In the end, some Bantu-speaking groups perceived this 
struggle for legitimacy and power as a conflict between the Bantu in the south and the non-Bantu 
(Nilotic) in the north (Ibid). The cycle of authoritarian ethnically structured rule escalated in 1971, when 
Amin seized power, disarmed the Acholi and Langi soldiers who constituted the backbone of the army 
and subsequently killed many of them, including many highly educated and influential members of other 
ethnic groups. To protect his regime in a new ethnic balancing tactic, Amin recruited new soldiers from 
West Nile and appointed prominent Bantu to important positions in his government, and largely   18
maintained the dominance of southerners in the civil service and commerce, while the northerners 
largely controlled the government and army (Otunnu and Laloyo). 
 
When political organisation on ethnic lines is taken to the extreme, the unit of mobilisation can become 
focused on the clan. This was evident in Somali where all clans are involved in the Somali conflict (the 
Hawiye, Darod, Isaq, Dir, Rahanweyn and the others) including almost all the minority groups, each 
with its own faction or as part of a coalition of factions (Farah; Hussein and Lind, 2002). Some clan 
groups have dominated the others, forcing the oppressed to look for and use any other means to survive 
in lawless Somalia, thus making each and every clan an actor in the conflict (Ibid).   
 
Since the transition to independence, the politicization of ethnicity and struggles for state power in 
Africa by various ethnic polities has been based on the interchanging demands for the centralization and 
decentralization of state structures and power, including demands for succession. Decentralization 
demands took various forms, from demands for federalism and the devolution of power to regional 
authorities, to the extreme cases of demands for secession (e.g. Biafra in Nigeria, Katanga in DRC).  
 
For example, competing demands made by KANU and other political parties, many of which had clear 
ethno-regional dimensions, were for centralization and decentralization respectively to be specified in 
the independence constitution. This reflected differences of interest between the “majority” and 
‘minority’ tribes. From then on general election results in Kenya reveal ethnically determined voting, 
with blatant ethno-regionally patterns, albeit coloured by some divisions among minority groups which 
could not unite against the ruling party (Oyugi, 1998). For example, in 1992  
“… Kikuyu-led parties which fielded credible presidential candidates (FORD Asili and the democratic party) swept 
all seats in Kikuyu land, while the Luo led party dominated in Luoland; the Kalenjin led KANU swept all the seats 
in Kalenji land” (Ibid).  
The over centralization of state power to counteract the dispersal of state resources to various ethnic 
groups via decentralized local government has become a key mobilisation strategy over time. For 
example in Liberia, when the government of president Tubman  
“… set out in 1944 to integrate the administration of the core (African-Liberian) and peripheral (indigenous) parts of 
Liberia by extending the county system to replace the erstwhile indirect provincial administration in the hinterland 
territories, which involved the expansion of infrastructural and educational facilities, the indigenous people began to 
question the right of a minority to monopolize power and to challenge Americo-Liberians’ claims to power” 
(Osaghe, 1998).  
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Federalism and Regional autonomy 
A critical question therefore is the extent to which decolonization and the belated emergence of 
democratic movements, in the context of constitutionalism and multi-party elections have encouraged 
nation-state governance systems that are inclusive and allow for power-sharing in the multi- ethnic and 
regionally differentiated African states. Indeed it has been argued that in Africa today, the trend towards 
political democracy has had the unexpected consequence of heightening ethnic and other forms of social 
tensions, especially in countries, such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where tensions have easily spilled over 
into neighboring states (Keller, 2002). Why for instance has federalism or improved regional autonomy 
and decentralized governance not been adopted in the new democratization processes?  
 
Instead it has been argued that in the “New World Order” era there has been a resurgence of nationalism 
among large ethnic groups which are incorporated into multi-ethnic states (Keller and Rothchild, 1996; 
Lake and Rothchild, 1998 cited by Keller, 2002). Even where the intensity of ethnic nationalism may be 
low (e.g. Kenya), ethnicity has tended to displace certain ethnic groups from the state or other groups 
have tended to purge them from regions they have inhabited for generations (Ibid). Thus the assimilation 
approach has not to work in situations where integration means hegemonic control according to the 
cultural preferences of the ruling ethnic group (Ibid), especially in countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia. 
The other option for addressing ethnic differences in governance systems such as partition or secession 
have also been unsuccessful but are actively considered in Somalia (Ogaden 1977-78); the Oromo in 
Ethiopia today; in Sudan (north-south). 
 
Lake and Rothchild (1998) cited by Keller (2002) identify four main trust-building options for national 
leaders: 1) demonstration of respect for all groups and their cultures; 2) formal or informal power 
sharing; 3) elections according to rules that insure either power sharing or the minimal representation of 
all ethnic groups in national politics; and 4) federalism or regional autonomy. African leaders are 
increasingly using these strategies, as opposed to hegemonic control, for long-term ethnic conflict 
management strategy (Ibid).  Power sharing strategies are said to becoming increasingly popular in 
Africa (Keller, 2002), with the most recent experiments being in Burundi, Djibouti, and South Africa, 
where according to (Shezi, 1995 cited by Keller, 2002), conscious attempts were made to assure some 
ethnic groups that they had group representation at the level of national government.  
 
However most political leaders in Africa exhibit only tentative commitment to power sharing through 
concern for social equity among different ethnic groups. In Ethiopia, for example, while the government   20
has policies which respect all the country’s nationalities and the constitution calls for the creation of 
ethnically based states that possess considerable autonomy, actual politics is structured such that the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front dominates at all levels (Keller, 2002). South Africa, 
where all-race, multi-party elections obtain, using proportional representation rules, so far does not have 
one party with an absolute majority (Reynolds, 1994 cited by Keller, 2002), and has shared executive 
power by the appointment of the leaders of other parties who did well in the elections to significant 
cabinet posts.  
 
Federation and regional autonomy approaches to building trust among ethnic groups have not been 
adopted as the preference is for strong provincial government. In Sudan regional autonomy strategy 
failed because of the hegemonic project of the Islamic fundamentalists. Nigeria has been relatively more 
successful at making federalism work in the wake of the Biafran Civil War since 1979, and today 
Nigeria has thirty-one states, intended to avoid future ethno-regional conflict (Keller, 2002). So far there 
have been no further serious threats to the maintenance of Nigeria’s national boundaries (Ibid), perhaps 
because of the commitment of its leadership and a relatively transparent federal system of allocation. 
 
Thus only when the indigenes became Liberian and citizens did they protest the injustices of their 
exclusion from state power and sought redress (Ibid). 
 
Ethnic mobilisation through political organisations tends to be systematically structured around the 
horizontal and vertical (and spatial) units of political parties. In Cote d’lvoire political organisation 
focuses on  
“… basic cells that are the district committees … which were indeed a paradox compared to the ideal of the single 
party, [and] the building of national unity. In the cities the party was organized on ethnic and tribal bases, thus 
reproducing the different ethnic components of the country at the level of the cities. In the cities, the mayors always 
call individuals on the basis of tribe to tribe, to collect their voters cards. Although this system was criticized by 
many militants as encouraging tribalism to the detriment of national integration, the ethnic structure was maintained 
up to 1986. ... Ethnic reflexes still persist as the new political elite play the ethnic trump card to the fullest for their 
own benefit” (Goninn, 1998). 
 
Another common framework used for mobilizing ethnicity, within a multi-party system besides formal 
political parties, are ethno-regional civic associations or organisations, which claim to promote local 
development and/or resistance  to inequity, or to promote the interests of professionals and the elite. In 
Ivory Coast for instance, due to the open policy of the French Popular Front Government, several 
regional associations of a truly political nature came into being (Ibid). These regionalist tendencies 
however also demonstrated the will of urbanites to transcend ethnic cleavages sponsored by the colonial   21
administration (Ibid). For, other class and market based process of social differentiation, sometimes 
deliberately manipulated by colonial and settler regimes, erected regional disparities which became 
mobilised to evoke ethnic sentiment. 
 
Perhaps one of the most extreme cases of the use of ethno-regional associations to mobilize power can 
be found in the long drawn experience of the Zulu in South Africa.  
“The significance of Zulu ethnic associations and cultural nationalism was that it diffused class-based organization 
and fractured national movements ...” Factionalism has characterized Natal political organization, where there were 
two branches of the African National Congress, one belonging to the national organization, and the other a virtually 
autonomous Natal variant …. Similarly, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union Yase Natal was one of the 
first of many fragments to break off from the national Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), and from 
the outset its activities were distinguished by the strong infusion of Zulu ethnic consciousness. In the 1920s the 
creation of the first Inkatha movement was explicitly seen as a counter to more radical tendencies and was envisaged 
by both the South African state and the black middle class as a counter to the ICU and to 'Bolshevik' propaganda in 
the countryside. It was also hoped that the Natal offshoot of the Natal Bantu Teachers' Organization, the Zulu 
Cultural Society, would play a similar conservative role in the 1930s and 1940s. More recently, the second Inkatha 
movement has been seen by many whites as the answer to more radical forms of politics, whether nationalist or 
more overtly class-based” (Marks, 1989). 
 
Yet, the  
“Zulu ethnic movement ... [was] a response to the immense social dislocations which resulted from capitalist 
development in South Africa. As increasing numbers of people were pushed into the towns in search of work, social 
relations in the countryside were transformed and whole communities disrupted. The cheap labour system and the 
racist ideology which accompanied South Africa's industrialization exacerbated the tensions” (Ibid). 
 
One political strategy frequently used to obtain and maintain political power on the basis of ethnicisation 
has been to declare the authenticity of the culture of the country as being derived from the culture of the 
ethnic group in power, and to use its language and culture, as well as education to reinforce its 
hegemony. This happened in Malawi where the Chewa in the 1970’s were anointed the “original” ethnic 
group (Vail and White, 1989), and using this ideological tool as justification, leadership purges in the 
state and the ruling party followed. This post colonial ethnic mobilisation effort was in fact mainly built 
around language policy, which had been earlier used in reverse to foment ethnic division to maintain 
colonial political power. For example,  
“… in mid-1968, Tumbuka [language], the symbol of northern regionalism since the early 1930s, was abolished as 
an official language and Chewa was made the sole national language. No longer could Tumbuka be used in the press 
or on the radio, [leading to] … resentment [in] the Northern Region. The Parliamentary Secretary for Education 
announced that all school-children who failed their examination in the now-required courses in Chewa would have 
to re-sit all their examinations” (Ibid). 
   22
The use of ethnic and race based political parties has been common in Africa. The growth of race based 
political parties was for long the main strategy used to mobilize political and socio-economic dominance 
or preferential access to privileges and power, in southern Africa. For example in South Africa, when  
“… coloureds, who had been led to believe that by disassociating themselves from the African population and [that] 
by supporting white parties they would be spared the political and economic humiliation that Africans were 
suffering, did not receive the [expected scope of] benefits equal to whites, their intellectuals abandoned white 
politics and formed specifically coloured political organizations” (Goldin, 1989).  
 
The formation and maintenance of ethnic identity and cohesion in furtherance of the concentration of 
power, has also been pursued through various social and symbolic processes. For example,  
“in Liberia the Americo-Liberians tended to paper over their differences in pursuance of collective security, and not 
only sought to monopolize power, but also to project a ‘superior’ class symbol: big luxurious cars and houses 
western dressing, education, Christianity, Masonic fraternities and Anglo-Saxon names” (Jones, 1962).  
Where possible, they segregated themselves from the natives in churches, urban neighbourhoods and 
meetings (Ibid).  
 
Where non-violent means failed to mobilise power violence was frequently the resort. The mobilisation 
of ethnically structured violence to win elections, prevent voting, weak political parties and even to 
decimate opponents (through their killing and exiling into refuge) has been used in many African 
countries.  
 
For example, the 1992 Kenya elections outcome was grounded in violent strategies of maintaining 
power in which politicians manipulated long-standing, but latent, inter-ethnic disputes over land, 
towards physical fight (see box 4-1). In the second multiparty elections in Kenya a new, more complex 
and catastrophic wave of ethnic violence evolved around agitation for a comprehensive constitutional 
review process in 1997. When non-ruling constituencies posed the clarion call "No reforms, No 
Elections," which the threatened ruling party, KANU reacted by using state power and vigilante groups, 
whose violence rocked Kenya's urban areas as well as the countryside. KANU again won the second 
multi-party general elections of December 1997, but these clashes continue (Ibid). 
Box 4-1: 
In 1991, “ethnic/land” clashes, which at their peak affected three of the eight provinces (Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western) and 
twenty out of the sixty-two Kenya's districts, erupted in Mteitei farm, Nandi district, Rift Valley Province. By November 
1993, over 1,500 people had been killed and more than 300,000 displaced. Thousands of people were displaced thus not able 
to cast their ballot. Violence continued after elections in such districts that were known to be pro-opposition as Nandi, 
Kericho, West Pokot, Trans-Nzioa, Kisumu, Kakamega, Bungoma, Nakuru and Uashin Gishu. The clashes served to frighten 
and intimidate non-Kalenjin ethnic groups (that presented a greater threat to the ruling elite of losing parliamentary seats and 
subsequent control of parliament and state power). Large numbers of Non-Kalenjin ethnic groups were displaced from the 
Rift Valley before the elections.  
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The military coup (violent or “bloodless”) and armed action have also been a key instrument for 
mobilizing ethnic dominance and ethnic balancing at the take over of power. For instance, in Burundi 
after independence in 1965, a political crisis emerged after the assassination of the Hutu leader, Pierre 
Ngendandumwe, turbulent legislative elections and an abortive coup against the monarchy by Hutu 
officers of the army and gendarmerie. This together with the devaluation of the Burundi Franc in 1964 
and the disruption of the Economic Community with Rwanda generated a cycle of violent ‘ethnic’ 
conflict, which was generally latent. This was escalated when several organizations of Hutu people 
formed in 1980, aware of their numerical superiority, perpetuated the cycle of attacking and killing 
Tutsis, with the army composed mainly of Tutsis since 1972, intervening and repressing Hutus (Rutake 
and Gahama, 1998). The massacre of Tutsi by Hutu, who were armed with machetes, together with the 
blind repression meted out by the army to the insurgents gave rise to a hecatomb that was described by 
many as Hutu genocide. The tragic events of 1969 and 1972 occurred during a period which was 
characterized by a political regime weakened by intrigue and the monopolization of power by a group of 
individuals from the same Tutsi group and from the same region of Burundi. The inability of the legal 
system to conclusively investigate and punish perpetrators found guilty of the violence strengthened the 
feeling that there was a plot to eliminate the Hutu and to protect the Tutsi (Ibid).  
 
While, the Hutu outnumber the Tutsi (six to one), the Tutsis have a significant fear of their safety if the 
Hutus take power, while the Hutus, who have historically been oppressed politically, socially, and even 
academically, want their fair share of the power. In June of 1993 in the Burundi election for instance, 
there were charges of ethnically-biased voting, but Ndadaye, the first civilian Hutu president dismissed 
these charges with reference to the demographic make up. On July 10, 1993, Ndadaye, on assuming the 
presidency, appointed to his administration members of his party, (Frodo), as well as members of the 
previous ruling party (UPRONA), and his prime minister was a female Tutsi, in search of ethnic 
balancing. This electoral approach to power was cut short by the Tutsi majority army led coup, which 
generated 700,000 refugees, and the sealing of the borders (Nomura, Davnie, Formari, Hasler and 
Nomura, 1996). Various power sharing accords have failed since then and the Hutus have felt that they 
weren't getting a fair share of power, while the Tutsis who felt that their traditional power base was 
threatened, and continue to dominant the army and politics, while discouraging active Hutu involvement 
in government (Nomura; Davnie; Formari and Hasler 1996). 
 
The use of violence and the related exiling of opponents has also been an important strategy used to 
exclude some groups on ethnic and racial grounds in Rwanda. For example, since 1991, civil war 
between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has resulted in tens of thousands of   24
deaths and the displacement of more than 2 million people (well over one-third of the population), many 
of whom are refugees in neighbouring countries. The announced restrictions on the people of Tutsi 
descent-who had lived in the neighbouring DRC for generations –acted as a major trigger and provided 
the opportunity to recruit an armed rebel movement that galvanized the Tutsis and other groups in 
opposition to Mobutu’s unpopular government in Kinshasa (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002).  
  
The “scapegoating” and targeting of particular ethnic groups in times of political conflict or competition 
has not been uncommon. In Rwanda for instance  
“… each time certain groups of individuals or agents of certain social fractions developed different mechanisms to 
challenge government, the Tutsi minority, in accordance with the models and practices culturally considered as 
principal references (as in 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990-93) and the tendencies geopolitically imposed by the dominant 
fraction of politicians that have ruled since independence, served as targets of retaliation and played the role of 
scapegoats “(Twagiramutara, 1998). 
 
The mobilisation of ethnicity to gain power in post-colonial times has tended to find infinitesimal 
opportunity as multiple differences of dialect beyond established ethnic categorisations gain currency as 
tools of political manipulation. In Zimbabwe for example, the white ruling class had first tried to  
“… divide the Ndebeles and Shonas by inciting tribalism and magnify[ing] their tribal differences [and then] to 
divide the Shonas themselves [by] break[ing] them into constituent clans-the Manyikas, Makaranga, Mazezuru, 
Makorekore, etc. It was then feared that for instance by “The Zimbabwe Star feared good-for-nothing megalomaniac 
so-called [sic African] leaders who cannot impress anybody [sic-would] resort to tribalism as an instrument for 
manufacturing support” (Ranger, 1989).  
In this way, ethnic competition for state power in Africa during the 20
th century has been the principal 
means for building socio-economic dominance. 
4.2 Ethnicity as vehicle for accumulation of wealth 
Besides the direct control of political power, socio-economic dominance has arisen from wider political 
economic processes in which ethnicity has tended to be co-opted, if not institutionalised. A major 
fulcrum around which most strategies to mobilize ethnic socio-economic and race dominance have been 
based in Africa has been around attempts to resolve Africa’s agrarian question. The dilemma of 
transforming (read “modernizing”) agriculture and expanding the related productive base of the 
economy is historically traceable to the inability of colonial capitalism to transform pre-capitalist 
relations of production, and the adoption of a development strategy which increasingly sought to bypass 
the African peasantry (Beckman, 1984). This strategy informed class formation processes focused on 
developing indigenous agrarian and commercial capitalists at the expense of the peasantry in general, 
through harnessing alliances of state and capital (domestic and foreign).  
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For instance, efforts to transform agriculture in Nigeria since the mid 1970s, in collaboration with the 
World Bank using Agricultural Development Projects (Egwu, 1998) focused on pockets of the elite in 
various regional enclaves, to the exclusion of some ethno-regional populations in particular, and the 
remote peasant social formations in general. Regional variations in natural resource and land 
endowments accompanied by the regional concentration of infrastructures and social services fermented 
an unequal ethnic distribution of socio-economic opportunity and exclusion. This provided ideological 
grounds for the evoking of ethnic motivations and deterministic thought in explaining these patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion, and the ethnicisation of inequalities which to a larger degree are based upon 
mainly local class based interest in alliance with external capital.   
 
Initial structural shifts in the livelihoods and occupations of Africans,  generated both during colonial 
and post-colonial periods, arose from fundamental economic and resource policy interventions centred 
on land expropriation, the enclosure of mining and regional enclaves and the creation of corridors of 
transport infrastructures, which had regional dimensions that served to segment opportunity along the 
geographic distribution of ethnic groups.  
 
For a long time most of the ethnic groupings in Africa had remained relatively introverted around their 
own economic, sociological and political systems, albeit interacting through long distance trade 
(Agyman, 1998). The expansion of colonial era trade however led to attempts by coastal inhabitants in 
West Africa in particular to mobilize themselves as privileged intermediaries between the Europeans 
and the African clientele of the hinterland (Ibid). This led to a social differentiation of an ethno-regional 
character and to conflict between the ethnic communities in towns where individuals of different origins 
met, as well as between coastal and northern regions. Thus the West African coast divided the southern 
groups from northern savanna/pastoralist social formations. In Kenya where colonial land alienation 
deprived mainly the Kikuyu, some of them instead of opting for squatter settlement, became petty 
traders, and seeking new and better markets, spread throughout the country, especially in new urban 
centres and along the railway lines. This ethnic dispersal into business influence attracted resentment 
from local communities leading to the crystallisation of ethnicity (Peacenet-Kenya, 2001). 
 
Racially based differentiation of economic power has coupled or inter-mixed with such ethno-regional 
wealth differentiation to promote socio-economic dominance and conflict. For example, in 1969 the 
Asian population in Uganda of about 70,000, (officially considered foreigners despite the fact that more   26
than 50% of them had been born in Uganda) had gained control of the retail and wholesale trade, cotton 
ginning, coffee and sugar processing, and other segments of commerce. President Amin deported most 
Asians in 1972 and only a few returned to Uganda in the 1980s to claim compensation for their 
expropriated land, buildings, factories, and estates. In 1989 the Asian population in Uganda was 
estimated at only about 10,000 (Otunnu and Laloyo). 
4.2.1 Education, employment and capital formation 
Access to education became a focus of ethnic based struggles for mobility, and competition for jobs on 
ethnic lines was aggravated by the education policies of colonial authorities. Missionary education was 
largely concentrated among the sedentary agricultural societies, which focused opportunity mainly on 
the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya lands, to the exclusion of pastoralists, notably the Maasai. Since formal 
education became the main basis of access to white-collar jobs, the historically favoured ethnic groups 
had mobilized better social capital to compete in the job market, well beyond the colonial period and in 
those urban centres dominated by some ethnic groups (Ibid). 
Education 
Education has been systematically mobilized in some countries to allocate advantage to dominant ethnic 
groups. An extreme example of this was in Malawi, where:  
“… the establishment of the Malawi Examinations Board to replace the Cambridge Overseas Examination was 
followed by a change in examination grading policy which required both northerners and southerners to obtain 
considerably higher grades in their school-leaving examinations than those in the Central Region if they were to 
qualify for places in the secondary schools. While economic opportunities were channelled to the people of the 
Central Region, school fees throughout the country were raised considerably, making access to education in the 
north and the south comparatively more difficult. The University of Malawi, the source of future bureaucrats and 
teachers, was systematically purged of its non-Chewa administrators and faculty in the early 1970s as part of an 
attempt to make it a secure seat for the elaboration of a Chewa ethos by loyal Chewa-speakers. Finally, to remove 
non-Chewa officers from the civil service, a mandatory retirement age of fifty was imposed and large numbers of 
northerners and southerners thereby retired. Non-Chewa-speaking northerners and southerners were also removed 
from other positions of authority through widespread and arbitrary detentions, especially between 1973 and 1976” 
(Vail and White, 1989). 
 
Ethno-regional inequality in educational services provision has had far reaching socio-economic effects 
in Africa. For instance in the southern regions of Malawi, where the migrant labour system was 
imposed, fewer schools were developed, while the north had more access to missionary education. This 
“...curtail[ed]… opportunities for raising capital through labour migrancy abroad [and] locked 
southerners firmly into continuing abject poverty. School fees are beyond the means of most villagers, 
and they … abandoned the belief in education as a route [out of] poverty” (Vail and White, 1989). 
 
In South Africa apartheid policy relegated the education of Coloured children    27
“… to missionaries and other private benefactors. In 1883 the enrolment at mission schools was 38,000, of whom 
fewer than 6000 were white. Their …restriction to the inferior mission schools … contributed to the forging of 
Coloured identity, as pupils and teachers came to recognize their common exclusion and mobilized to increase their 
claim on the state system” (Goldin, 1989). 
 
Systematic discrimination by race in education provision in settler Africa, was guided by separate 
African education policy, which was  
“… based on trusteeship and segregation. [and] was not supposed to drain government resources away from white 
education. The number of schools for blacks increased during the 1960s, but their curriculum was designed to 
prepare children for menial jobs. Per-capita government spending on black education slipped to one-tenth of 
spending on whites in the 1970s. Black schools had inferior facilities, teachers, and textbooks” (I upinfo, 2000). 
However when the South African government in the mid-1970’s enforced its most extreme 
discriminatory Bantu education system, and the  
“… regulation requiring that one-half of all high-school classes must be taught in Afrikaans” (Ibid), 
student demonstrations led to the deaths of 575 people, 134 of whom were under eighteen, and the 
abandonment of schools by many (Ibid).  
The result of racial discrimination in South Africa as (1 upinfo, 2000) the quote shows:  
“Teacher: pupil ratios in primary schools averaged 1:18 in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, and 1:27 in 
coloured schools, and 1:39 in black schools. Moreover, whereas 96 percent of all teachers in white schools had 
teaching certificates, only 15 percent of teachers in black schools were certified. Secondary-school pass rates for 
black pupils in the nationwide, standardized high-school graduation exams were less than one-half the pass rat e for 
whites.” 
 
In absolute terms educational discrimination by race in South Africa was by 1995 as follows:  
“The number of teachers in the regular primary and secondary schools was 344,083 of whom 226,900 were black. 
Of the white teachers, more than 60 percent were Afrikaners. Men teachers were paid substantially more than 
women; women's salaries averaged 83 percent of men's salaries for the same job with equal qualifications” (Ibid). 
 
But even in independent Africa unequal access to education on ethnic grounds had emerged. The 
provincial distribution of schools in most countries is frequently skewed in favour of urban centers, 
which in turn may be predominantly populated by given ethnic groups, leading to specific patterns of 
socio-economic dominance to access and lead  to knock on effect such as differential access to 
employment. In Zimbabwe this is the effect of the pull around Harare, which other ethnic groups 
(Karanga and Ndebele ) have alleged to be a deliberate state policy of ethnic dominance building (Table 
4-2). 
 
Employment and occupational differentiation 
One of the mechanisms through which ethnicity becomes an instrument of dominance and exclusion, is 
the generation of perceived inferiority stereotypes which reinforce occupational segregation. For 
instance in Zambia,  
“The Luvale in particular … developed an urban reputation as night soil carriers and menial workers, [as they 
gained]… very lowly ethnic identifications in town. [This]… ethnic identification was … an idiom used in the   28
broader political economy of the urban centres in the competition for better jobs… That perceived low ethnic status 
was a hindrance to finding jobs …” (Papstein, 1989). 
On the other hand 
 “… by 1964, the time of Zambian independence, certain ethnically defined groups had come to dominate the choice 
positions within certain sectors of the economy. The Bemba, for example, had achieved this in the mining sector … 
For decades such preferences were 'justified' or accepted… [While]… most Upper Zambezian people held relatively 
unskilled positions, [and] the possibilities for rising in the system were limited. [Meanwhile]… within contemporary 
Zambian society certain ethnic groups or 'tribes' have larger representation in certain government departments or 
parastatals than their absolute numbers would permit in a random selection of qualified personnel” (Papstein, 1989). 













Manicaland  16 769  18  233  785 251 
Mashonaland  Central  6 363  11  101  369 112 
Mashonaland  East  11 569  13  229  580 242 
Mashonaland  West  32 449  18  146  481 164 
Matebeleland  North  71 501  39  99  572 138 
Matebeleland  South  10 430  10  107  440 117 
Midlands  29 620  29  201  649 230 
Masvingo  6 673  16  223  679 239 
Harare  110 93  54  23  199 77 
Total 2001  291  4467  208  1362  4 758  1 570 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 2003 
 
The manipulation of ethnicity around discriminatory employment opportunity has always been based on 
the foundation of the “tribe” and the use of rural areas as the filter for preferential allocation of resources 
and opportunity in urban areas as well.  
“The colonial state [in Zambia, for instance] had encouraged the creation of tribal groups in the rural areas and 
[used] these identities … within the urban industrial economy as well, reinforcing the rural [ethnic] perceptions. 
[While]… rural peoples had to identify themselves with a 'tribe' in order to 'fit in' and enjoy official legal recognition 
in their local district, … the Pass System ... [was used to] … allow only so many tribesmen to migrate to town… to 
identify and tacitly to separate workers according to their presumed abilities into such categories as the 'clever' 
Bemba or Lozi and the 'backward and wild' Luvale or Lamba” (Ibid). 
This approach had also been elaborated on racial grounds in southern Africa, where discrimination 
against “Coloureds” did not mean that they lost their employment and wealth privileges over blacks.  
Thus: 
“At the same time the increasing distinction drawn between Coloureds and Africans and the exemption of Coloureds 
from certain of the restrictions endured by Africans undermined possible black ethnic solidarity. For many Coloured 
men and women there was simply too much to lose through identification with Africans” (Vail and White, 1989). 
 
By 1902 occupational segregation by race shaped the development of coloured politics leading to the 
formation of the African Peoples' Organization (APO), who’s founding President sought to extend 
Coloured education as a means to advance the participation of Coloureds in the ruling polity. This “… 
reflected their determination … to secure for it’s more skilled and petty bourgeois constituents some 
political and economic benefit.” However such race mobilisations was proscribed by class differences. 
“... unskilled (Coloured) men and women were not similarly motivated by a desire to challenge the   29
increasing racial exclusiveness of white trade unionists.” In recent times, the “… continued campaign 
for the advance of Coloured rights, using the tactics of discretionary collaboration …” was challenged 
by some, “… especially the socialists committed to a non-racial society” (Ibid). 
 
Moreover colonial authorities fostered ethnicity, through preferential and stereotypical job recruitment 
policies which favoured some ethnic groups for some occupations over others. For instance the 
recruitment of the armed forces, in Kenya, favoured the Kamba and the Kalenjin. Since the British 
considered, these ‘martial tribes’ (Oyugi, 1998). The Luo on the other hand enjoyed disproportionate 
representation in some state corporations, such as, the railways, and once dominant in given 
employment sectors nepotism expanded and perpetuated unequal employment opportunity for decades 
after independence (Ibid). 
 
Socio-economic dominance and exclusion by ethnic grouping tends to be fostered by the exclusive 
control of virtually all economic privileges and opportunities by government, and more specifically by 
executive presidents, though patronage systems of power, which Sawyer (Osaghae, 1998) characterizes 
as ‘proprietorship’, as well as the personalized nature of group struggles for power. In Liberia for 
example, personal rule was the mainstay of power right down to the Doe years (Ibid). All executive 
appointments, including those of the University of Liberia, were at the president’s disposal. There was 
no ‘formal distinction between political and non-political appointments, nor (was) there any formal 
provision for recruitment and promotion within government departments (Clapham, 1976) cited by 
Osaghae, (1998). This validates the thesis of Sklar (1967) that ethnicity becomes a mask for class 
privilege (ibid), a process where the selfish designs of members of the privileged class are couched in 
ethnic terms. 
 
The struggle for state power breeds conflicts and exclusionary processes in precisely the sectors which 
directly contribute to the capacities of competing groups in this struggle, especially in fields such as 
education, commerce, employment, the armed forces and party politics. While the inherent dangers of 
ruling group monopoly over all privileges and benefits, have at times been addressed by ethnic 
balancing attempts in these sectors, in the medium term persistent inequalities sustain allegations of the 
domination of some ethnic groups, such as those levelled against the Krahn under Doe and certainly the 
Americo-Liberians before 1980 (Ibid). 
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The practice of “colour bar” or privilege in employment opportunity in Africa was most developed to its 
extreme of employment segregation in the settler colonies (South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and 
Namibia), leading to long term racially grounded bitterness and the search for radical approaches to its 
reversal. “The strategy not only favoured whites but those of mixed race (‘Coloureds’), the majority of 
whom were channelled into formal wage labour” (Ibid).Some ethnic groups were favoured as adjuncts 
of white rule. Those whom the settlers in South Africa for example termed 'Hottentots', were mostly 
absorbed into colonial service and tended to be considered 'the most efficient troops for dealing with the 
Kaffirs” (Giliomme, 1989). Thus the “Khoi and other 'Hottentots' people were offered some protection 
in employment and civil society, placing them in a position which was relatively superior to that of the 
Bantu-speaking peoples.” This strategy was extended to the differential enfranchisement of “coloured” 
people, because as the Cape Attorney-General, William Porter argued:  
“I would rather meet the Hottentots at the hustings voting for his representative than meet the Hottentots in the wilds 
with a gun on his shoulder. …. is it not better to disarm them by letting them participate in the privileges of the 
constitution than by refusing them those long expected privileges to drive them into laager.” 
 
However preferential allocation of employment to the working classes were complicated in most regions 
by state policies which encouraged more settler immigrants and imported migrant labour, especially in 
southern Africa. For instance, the arrival between 1857 and 1883 in Cape Town of nearly thirty 
thousand immigrants, many of whom were experienced in artisan and craft occupations, led to increased 
competition for scarce jobs within the coloured working class at the Cape, and threatened the Cape 
Malay monopoly over many crafts (Giliomee, 1989). 
Race based employment discrimination has also been mobilized through unions and various guilds in the 
crafts. In South Africa for instance  
“… the increasingly discriminatory tactics of white trade unionists in 1900 saw the white stonemasons' society 
preventing Coloured stonemasons from working on public buildings, [while] … the Plasterers' Union barred 
Coloured labour and forbade its members to work 'on a scaffold with a Coloured or Malay under pain of a fine'. 
Coloured craftsmen were excluded from big projects such as the construction of the University of Cape Town. Such 
prejudice became articulated through industrial legislation, such as by the 1906 amendments to the Mines Act which 
reserved many of the skilled, supervisory and managerial jobs for whites” (Goldin, 1989).  
 
These restrictions on upward mobility (and miscegenation) encouraged the development of a distinct 
Coloured identity, given that at some point the state also blocked the strategy used by light skinned 
skilled and petty bourgeois Coloured people of attempting to 'pass for white'. Thus, fewer “… light-
skinned petty bourgeois and the more skilled and educated members of the colonized class were now 
able to gain admission to the ruling class in the Cape” (Ibid). 
 
Overtime, racial discrimination in South Africa employment had been reinforced to such extreme levels 
as shown below (Table 4-3).   31
Table 4-3: Percentage of Economically active Population According to Occupation, 1991 
(Excluding TBVC) 
Occupation Whites  Coloured  Asians  Blacks 
Professional, semi-professional and 
technical 
81 4  5  9 
Nursing 35  14  3  49 
Education and Related  29  12  4  55 
Managerial, executive and administrative  79  4  68  9,6 
Clerical and Sales  49  11  7,7  32 
Transport, delivery and Communication  11  8  2,7  78 
Service 11  11  1,0  78 
Farming and Related  7  17  0,25  76 
Artisans, apprentice and related  36  14  4,7  45 
Production supervisor, miner and quarry  6  14  3,0  78 
Not Specified  6  10  2,5  81 
Total 21  12  3,3  64 
Source: Central Statistical Services, 1993 
 
The most recent legislative and policy reforms to counter racial and ethnic socio-economic dominance 
of South Africa, are noteworthy, although they appear fragile and achievable only in the long term (over 
15 years), if at all. For example the South African public sector is formally multicultural given that the 
state is multi-plural in respect to language, culture, traditions, norms and values of society, unlike the 
previous racial segregationist policies. Since 1994 a climate conducive for nation building and 
reconciliation among various ethnic groups prevails, and race based elections and ethnic conflicts 
fomented particularly in the former “Black homelands” or “Self-governing states, have been outlawed. 
However, the vestiges of apartheid and separate development are still prevalent in all structures of 
governance, including in the pattern of ethnic group dominance of certain positions in government, and 
in the existing xenophobia among the diverse ethnic groups within the South African public sector (Mail 
& Guardian, 2001). Indeed ethnicity and conflict in the South African public sector threatens negatively 
the sustainable delivery of public services (Ibid). Apparently racial groups that were oppressed in the 
past are continuously mobilizing themselves, because the constitution provides them the scope to seek 
opportunity, and the ruling elite is not acting swiftly and proactively enough to deal with resilient ethnic 
conflicts particularly in the workplace (Eller and Coughlan, 1993).  
 
Since Government is the largest employer it oversees a multi-ethnic and diverse multi-cultural labour 
force of the interdependent groups, where cohesion and new norms and values are being built for sound 
mutual race relations among the employees (Ibid). Good work relations in the public sector require a 
change of attitude and behaviour of both the management and employees, and race relations need to be 
treated with sensitivity and passion (Nieuwmeijer and du Toit, 1994). The resultant unchanged attitudes 
is that black South Africans are    32
“… treated in a manner that is unacceptable, because if you go to any public domain you get a poor service but a 
white person is better preferred … a white person does not do this to another white person but black persons … do 
so because of the inferiority complex inculcated to the minds of the African people. What make things worse is the 
language that one speaks determines to a larger extent whether you’ll get the service … [especially if one] speaks 
the language of the attendant. Therefore to try to address the imbalances of legacy of the past the government of the 
day one cannot use race neutral policies.” (Mail & Guardian, 2001).  
Thus ... rising careerism and opportunist leadership have been created after the establishment of a 
democratic system of government in South Africa, as notions of self-interest and personal advancement 
override the interests of the taxpayers, professionalism and effectual managerial abilities. However, 
while formal race and ethnic differences have become blurred, nominally white top managers are 
reluctant to transform and change their attitudes toward other ethnic groups (Ibid). 
 
Magasela argues that the most dangerous ethnic conflict in the public sector is among blacks, where for 
instance if you apply for a job in a Xhosa or Sesotho dominated region and you do not know people 
there or their languages, there is a high probability that you might not get the job. Someone who speaks 
the language would be favoured, that is ethnic discrimination and if your last name is not known to the 
panel members and one has not established his/her name in the corporate world. The extreme cases … 
are [in] the ethnic composition of the state departments in each of the nine provinces (Magasela, 2001). 
4.2.2 Land, natural resources and minerals: Differential access by identity 
Many ethnic conflicts over socio-economic dominance in Africa are structured by dominance over land 
and national resources, which are the key source of livelihood and wealth, and sources of the means to 
pay for education and hence to attain non-agricultural employment. The degree of such conflicts 
however varies by region depending on specific histories of land concentration, the farming systems and 
political economic structures that sustain resource inequalities.  
 
The land question as a source of ethnic and racial differences and dominance has tended to be 
underplayed in sub-Sahara Africa outside of former settler colonies (Zimbabwe, RSA, Namibia), even 
though it tends to be a common problems in many countries, including in relatively stable economies 
and democracies. For example in Botswana a land problem with ethnic dimensions exists. Official post-
cold war discourses on land are however tampered by the neo-liberal paradigm which has assumed a 
hegemonic position, such that it appears that there are no substantive differences between opposition 
parties and the ruling party in Botswana on fundamental questions relating to class based ownership of 
the means of production, and elites mainly quarrel over how to share national resources (Molomo, 
2003). Yet a few civil society organisations, which are moving beyond the neo-liberal model of 
democracy (e.g. the enjoyment of basic freedoms, civil liberties and regular free and fair elections), are 
increasingly calling for economic empowerment and social justice over land and natural resources   33
allocations, if Botswana is to avoid future conflict (Ibid). Thus, in spite of the predominantly middle 
class social base of NGO’s which dominate the “visible” debate within the current power structure and 
distribution of economic resources, and their external donor driven linkages (Ibid), there is an incipient 
struggle over the land question. 
 
Increasingly the land struggles in Botswana involve ethnic minorities challenging the dominant 
paradigm of the nation-state and nation building, which is constructed through the diffusion of the 
values of the majority culture of the dominant Tswana groups (Ibid). For example, the minority 
Basarwa, often referred to as remote area dwellers, in terms of their spatial position and political power, 
have historically been a servile underclass exploited by dominant Tswana groups, and other so-called 
minority groups as cattle herders and labourers (Molomo, 2003). Removed from the major urban centres 
and, gaining limited government rural development and infrastructural facilities, they were recently 
moved out of the large area in northern Botswana called Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), in a 
manner which subverted their land rights and natural resources based livelihoods, in order to expand the 
national tourist industry. Also large tracts of land have over the last 30 years been parcelled out of 
“customary lands” and given to over 1,000 indigenous elites, who now comprise a dominant land 
controlling class with access to state support for livestock farming, at the expense of small scale 
pastoralists and agriculturists. Whereas this land expropriation has been done in accordance with the 
“rule of law,” and in an orderly and gradual manner, it does not obviate the long term dangers of land 
concentration and currently scattered protests over land.  
 
In Ivory Coast conflicts over land, especially in the South (between long term migrants from the North 
and from neighbouring countries in the north), are an underlying source of the current political conflict 
and armed rebellion. Land conflicts emerged when political (electoral) competition led to the 
questioning of the citizenship (hence voting) rights of immigrant, in relation to their land and residency 
rights in the south and west. Attempts to introduce new land tenure and citizenship laws in the late 
1990’s gave an impetuous to land conflicts. Land conflicts revolved around differences over policy 
changes which led to decentralized management of land and natural resources in order to restore 
decision–making powers to local communities and legislative reforms which promoted the privatization 
of land through land registration in open recognition of local rights (Delville, 1999). Ivory Coast’s Rural 
Land Plan (RLP) pilot project (from 1999-2000) sought to map all existing rights in order to give them 
legal status. This triggered the questioning of the land rights of long term immigrants, and led to ethnic 
divisions alongside the north-south divide of ethnicity and religious difference.  
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Data from the RLP registration showed that the nature of land tenure arrangements was often unclear in 
many areas, and in particular that they were not perceived in the same way by the indigenous people and 
the migrants (Zalo, 2001). Given that official documents such as the land certificate and their legal 
consequences were not adequately disseminated to people, there was uniformed renegotiation of 
previously conceded land rights (Zalo, 2001). Since land is scarce and, is a limiting factor for socio-
economic development because the size of family agricultural plots are small, the roots of land conflict 
in Ivory Coast can be more widespread than is understood, given that land distribution is uneven. There 
are 3,744 traditional large farms and 1,076 modern farms and a number of agro-industrial plantations 
(palm-tree oil, hévéa, sugarcane and pineapple-banana plantations), but traditional owners of the land 
are not beneficiaries of the exported products, and do not have access to various goods and services 
(Zalo, 2001). Because in the customary system, the value of agricultural land is measured in terms of its 
development and seldom according to its intrinsic value, (i.e. it is not an officially exchangeable good), 
land cannot be offered as a guarantee to creditors for loans necessary for intensive development, and it is 
difficulty to rent or sell land at good prices, poverty persists among most of the rural populations, in 
contrast to the minority of “modern” farms (Ibid). 
 
According to government statistics, migrants in the Ivory Coast who because of the lack of proof of their 
citizenship and land tenure status can be refused formal land certificates, represent 11 to 45% of the 
population, while the non-Ivorian growers who can expect, at best, the right to rent land, represent 
between 22% and 43% of the population. This has diminished the sense of land security among 
“successful farmers” in the more productive areas of Ivory Coast, particularly in the Southwest, where 
young orchards are still maturing, migrant and “foreign” operators are aggrieved by the new land law 
(Zalo, 2001). The new land law also affects the incomes of the indigenous people, who find themselves 
holders of land title documents that have been withheld from the migrants, and whose production 
capacities are limited by various technical and financial constraints. This raises the risk of increased 
inequality emerging within the indigenous populations since holding land title does not automatically 
lead to increased output and agricultural stability. Furthermore, individual land ownership or access 
among young operators is currently difficult, especially in western Ivory Coast, and will probably be 
affected by the new laws (at the cost of intra-family tensions), if land is monopolized, as it seems to be, 
by elders, given that the new law reinforces gerontocratic parameters of land rights bidding (Ibid). 
 
Land conflicts in Ivory Coast are not new, as they have existed since 1950, but have however, taken a 
more violent form over the past ten years (1990s), with the disappearance of the forest, the scarcity of 
available land for a new generation of growers, and the drastic reduction of the incomes drawn from the   35
urban activities for the large majority of the population originally from rural areas, especially the youth 
(Zalo, 2001). The initial and direct origin of these conflicts is not always a conflict about access to and 
use of land, but in certain cases it stems from the questioning by the indigenous people of land use rights 
acquired by the migrants, especially in recent years (Zalo, 2001). Consequently, the land question 
remains a crucial concern for the future.  
 
Conflict between different ethnic groups within Ethiopia is common, for example, between pastoralist 
groups in competition for the control of grazing lands and water supplies. These conflicts increase 
during droughts (Flintan and Tamrat, 2002). The nature of communal conflict in Ethiopia took new 
forms following the demarcation of boundaries which fragmented groups and impeded cross border 
movements essential to the viability of customary land and resource-use systems (Ibid). The Haud 
pastures found in the Ogaden region, for example, were for long a source of conflict between the 
Ogaden and the Ishaq Somali clan’s, and earlier competition to control the Haud pastures rarely entailed 
large loss of life (Ibid). Following the colonial scramble for the control of the horn of Africa, conflicts 
took a more political nature. The Ogaden, where the Haud pastures are situated, came under Ethiopian 
territory under the 1887 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. Since the Ishaq were under British administered 
Somaliland and outside Ethiopian territory, the claim to the Haud pastures between the Ogaden and 
Ishaq clans became a territorial dispute (Ibid). These ethnic conflicts stem from the marginalization of 
some groups by a state that monopolizes the control of the production and distribution of resources .By 
holding such power over resources, the state has the ability to favour one group, particularly the 
highland of Amhara and Tigrai ruling elites in Ethiopia, while discriminating against other groups such 
as the Oromo or Somali in the south and east (Flintan and Tamrat, 2002). 
 
The experience of post independence Nigeria’s agrarian development strategy and land policy has for 
instance had the effect of promoting pervasive co-modification of land which hitherto was regarded as 
communal property. The attendant land grabbing has led to a decline in the proportion of land available 
to the smallholding peasantry (See box 4-2). Indeed, it has led to peasants being manipulated by urban 
and local `big wigs` pitted against one another in struggles for land (Egwu, 1998). Thus the rising 
spectre of violent conflicts in Nigeria’s rural setting lends to credence to the argument that ethnic 
identity is always mobilized in causes whose real utility can only be conceived in class terms (Darrow, 
1974 cited by Oyugi, 1998; Sklar, 1967 cited by Osaghae, 1998).  
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In Kenya colonial land injustices and contemporary land policies have had far-reaching and varying 
effects on the control and access to land by the majority of the people. Increasingly land ownership 
patterns are derived from endowments arising from class differentiation strategies which emerged in the 
colonial era (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003), and have lead to growing landlessness. Thus 20% of the  
Box 4-2 
Case study of the Mambila plateau 
The Mambila plateau is naturally endowed; and has attracted both agriculturists and pastoralist (George 1990), and 
accounts for its mixed ethnic configuration. Ethnic groups include Mambila (believed to be the first settlers), Kaka, 
Kamba and Banso, as well as Fulani pastoralists and settled Hausa communities. Significantly is occupationally 
differentiated along ethnic lines. The Mambila’s are predominantly peasant farmers, the Fulbe pastoralists, while the 
Banso and Kamba control commerce. The most significant way in which the socio-economic system influences the 
emergence of interethnic violence, since the 1980s revolves around management of the land. 
The ecological depletion of the plateau due to widespread sheet erosion and reinforces the dilemma facing the farmers. 
Thus the changing patterns in land use, occupational differentiation along ethnic lines and demographic change lead to a 
distinct pattern of social differentiation. Increasing landlessness marginalized the Mambila peasant farmers, vis-à-vis the 
more prosperous Fulani grazers and the commercially inclined Banso and Kamba. Where the Mambila pursue court 
adjudication over the conflicts related to land, the pastoralists use their economic power to pervert the course of justice. 
Ethnic clashes between the Mambilas and other communal groups in the 1980s and the continued tension on the plateau is 
thus squarely rooted in agrarian matters. The Mambilas have used varied strategies to address their plight, including 
becoming tenant farmers or migrating to Cameroon or resisting oppression. However most Mambilas have expressed their 
resistance to oppression and exploitation by violent means, directed to all those perceived as `strangers` rather than the 
grazers and urban elite who pose immediate threat to land.’ The Mambila political leaders promise their vote use their 
positions to change in the status quo by redistributing land to the Mambila whose birth right had been denied by aliens’. 
While the land mass has remained static, the cattle and human populations have increased exponentially, peaking in the 
1970s and leading to increased land conflicts and heightened overgrazing with the direct consequences on local economy 
performance and inter-ethnic relations, as ethnic and occupational boundaries overlap. Landholding on the plateau is 
heavily skewed against the smallholders who constitute 98% of the population (table 2), while the grazers and large 
estates that account for 1,1%of the population control most of the land. Between 1979 and 1989 about 115 individuals 
and companies had acquired 14,655hectares of land through the land and Survey Ministry in Yola, an average of 122 
hectares per person. Similarly, within the same period, the Sandauna Local Government made a total allocation covering 
8,815 hectares an average of 93 hectares per person.  
 
Table 1: Summary of statistics on cattle and human population on the Mambila plateau 
Periods Cattle  number  Human 
population  Land area (Ha)  No of Divided 
area  Towns and villages 
1930 18,181  -  -  -  - 
1949 120,000  -  -  -  - 
1963 234.980  95,148  498-500  32  290 
1979 450,000  134,256  -  -  - 
1989 617,643  169,872  -  -  - 
Source: Gembu Tax Office 
 
Table 2: Land use categories on the Plateau, 1976-1990 
Type of holding  No of 
holders 




% Of total 
covered  Ave Holding (ha) 
Small scale holding  51,389 98,90  28,000  7,1  0,53 
Grazing land holding  360 0,70  304,500  76,4  890,3 
Large estate  210  0,40 23,500 5,9  111,3 
Built up area  -  -  250  0,1  - 
Degraded area  -  -  37,750  9,4  - 
Natural Forests  - -  4,500  1,1 - 
Total 51,959  100.00  398,500  100,00  - 
Source: Gembu Tax Office, Ministry of land Survey Office, Gembu   37
 
Kenyan population own over 50% of the arable land, while the rest own an average of one acre, and 
13% are landless, or do not have any protectable right over land, and are referred to as “squatters,” 
“trespassers” or “adverse possessors” (Ibid). The colonial Swynnerton land tenure reform plan led to a 
markedly skewed distribution of land, with chiefs, loyalists, and the wealthy acquiring more land than 
others while the lower social groups lost considerable amounts of land, especially where they had not 
participated in this colonial adjudication of land rights (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003). This has 
generated continued post-colonial land disputes based on decreased tenure security amongst the majority 
(Haugerud, 1983, 1989, 1992; Shipton, 1988; Fleuret, 1988; Mackenzie, 1990), and has led to open 
abuse of land allocations by those involved in defining the existing structure of land rights.  
 
Because Kenya’s land law grants enormous powers of control of land to the President who holds land in 
trust for the state, the President tends to grant land to a few individuals and corporate interests. This 
concentration of power over land in the Presidency and the central government has undermined the 
pressure for the democratisation of land ownership, and has eroded the social bases of popular 
institutions for regulating land allocations, due to individualization of much of the land. This process has 
affected the majority of the lands utilized by pastoralists who occupy and use over two thirds of Kenya 
landmass (Ibid). 
From the early 1990s, pressures for political liberalization led to the appropriation of government land 
by political elites at an even a faster pace, as Moi struggled to retain a clientele of loyalists (Ibid). Thus 
elites appropriated the land in question for their political project against the multi-partyist opposition and 
resurrected the Majimbo land demand to deflect the multiparty debates. This reactivated demands for 
territory in the Rift Valley and on the coast (as happened in the 1960s) and led to ethnic land clashes 
between members of former KADU groups and the immigrant population in the Rift Valley, and later on 
in the coast,  between the Mijikenda and upcountry Kikuyu and Luo immigrants. Large groups of 
Kikuyu families were evicted from the Rift Valley, their titles to land notwithstanding (Lumumba and 
Kanyinga, 2003). 
 
Even in Uganda, post-colonial land reforms led to the accumulation of huge tracts of land in the hands 
of the politically powerful elite at the expense of the peasantry, all institutions of land governance were 
later taken over by the state in 1991, leading to the distortion of land distribution by ad hoc land 
allocation practises and conflict (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003).  
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This trend of growing land concentration is quite common throughout Africa. For example, increased 
privatisation of state lands in Mozambique, as part of the foreign investment drive has crowded out the 
poor onto the worst lands. This has created grounds for incipient racial animosity, as foreigners and 
white South Africans tend to dominate this investment. The emigration of white Zimbabweans who 
“lost” their land to Mozambique exacerbates these land inequalities (Moyo, 2003). 
  
However in general, land based ethnic conflicts in much of Africa, particularly in West Africa, are 
derived from the conflictual relationship over the power of the state vis-à-vis that of customary law 
authorities (Mathieu, 1996) to allocate land. In formal law (e.g. in Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso) where 
the “traditional chiefs’ are granted the right to mediate “customary rights,” this is most often limited 
solely to the right to cultivate (Delville, 1999). This contradicts fundamental aspects of customary land 
tenure regimes, wherein the authorities responsible for land allocation also play a role in regulating local 
land-use systems (Delville, 1999). But although the state has taken over the absolute right of land 
allocation, these local authorities usually remain legitimate in the eyes of the community and continue to 
enjoy considerable political power (Ibid) over land management systems. The right of eminent domain 
and the power to allocate land rights are fundamental to customary systems and the power of local 
authorities, hence pre-colonial states using their right of conquest, tended to allocate land to their clients 
or servants (Ibid).  
State control over land allocation and concession procedures by both the colonial and independent 
African governments, tends to however be delegated to elected rural councils (e.g. in Senegal), through 
various forms of land allocation procedures (Delville, 1999); leading to conflicts between formal law 
and customary land rights. This has especially afflicted French-speaking West Africa. Since the 
territorial distribution of local “traditional” authorities are generally  based upon lineage/clan social 
structures with particular ethnic identities, such  land conflicts tend therefore to assume an explicit or 
implicit ethnic character. 
 
For instance territorially based ethnic clashes over land are common in Kenya. As the Kalenjin and the 
Maasai were condemning especially the Kikuyu settlement of their land, the latter were also asserting 
their right to such land (cited by Lumumba, Ibid from East Africa Standard 1 September 1992). This 
situation was occasioned by the preferential settlement of the landless Kikuyu under the Land Transfer 
Scheme started by the colonial government on the eve of independence (Haberson, 1973 cited by Oyugi, 
1998). The government ignored protests over this leading, the Kalenjin to organize resistance to further 
settlement, and thereafter resulting, culminating in the Nandi-Luhya clashes of the 1980’s (Oyugi,   39
1998). It is thus evident that ethnic feelings about ancestral land ownership generate violent conflict 
(Ibid). 
 
But land conflicts reflect wider resource based conflicts, including competition for grazing and water 
resources, as well as disputes over community territorial land and district borders, especially because in 
large parts of Africa land use is dominated by pastoralism which is the only economic and social 
livelihood in various countries. For example in Kenya, physical confrontations have assumed well-
organized military tactics including: killing people, destroying property and burning houses. Animals are 
raided in large numbers, of even up to over 1,000 livestock in a single raid (Peacenet-Kenya, 2001). The 
political motivation of such violent land conflicts is a common phenomenon, given the tendency for 
politicians to manipulate them. For example, in the Rift Valley region of Kenya, (covering Trans-mara, 
Narok, Kajiado, Usin Gishu and Elgeyo Marakwet, Pokot, TransaNzoia, Laikipia and Nakuru North 
Rift) political violence is associated with the fact that residents are dissatisfied by the existing land 
tenure policies and the general legal regime responsible for land because it does not clearly address their 
land rights and land leases (Ibid). Yet at another level, there is evidence of rampant crop theft and crop 
destruction instigated and executed by rival communities (Ibid). 
 
Thus the general the causes of land conflict in non- settler Africa include: the grabbing and sale of 
communal land and favouritism in its allocation; partisan roles of security agents in mediating conflicts; 
the squatting in communal land; the commercialization of cattle rustling and competition over natural 
resources such as pastures, water and livestock; human and wildlife land use conflicts. In many areas 
political intimidation including the use of illegal firearms has become  common. 
 
Historical colonial alliances over the control of land explain some of these conflicts The alliance 
between the British administrators and the Yao elite in Malawi for example, deepened when the latter 
were chosen as the instrument for indirect rule:  
“…. with loyal Yao chiefs ruling over docile Nguru workers to further the successes of the European plantation 
economy and to maintain order. The Yao chiefs … in so doing … were promoting their own personal and economic 
power rather than any broadly conceptualized notion of Yao unity or identity. The great majority of Yao-speakers 
remained Muslim and hence were hostile to the establishment of the sort of Christian schools” (Vai and White, 
1989). 
 
But the legacy of settler colonial land expropriation remains the source of the extreme land conflicts in 
Africa. Racial inequality in the control of or access to land in Africa has been most extreme in the 
former settler colonies, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Kenya. Indeed this led to radical   40
land reforms in Mozambique (1976) and Zimbabwe (since 2000). The proportions of land held by racial 
minorities ranged from 87% in South Africa by 1994 to 50% and 30% in Zimbabwe by 1980 and 1999. 
The genesis and mobilisation of race and ethnicity over land distribution has been a complex socio-
political process of conflicts filled with numerous contradictions arising from various factors. For 
example in South Africa there were various:  
“… stumbling blocks to a developed ethnic consciousness … based on internal class conflict in Dutch-Afrikaner 
society, decentralized power structures, and regional rivalries. Power in both the Free State and the Transvaal was 
effectively in the hands of the large landholders, sometimes called patriarchs, who established patron-client 
relationships with both their family dependants and bygones, or landless Afrikaners. By the 1870s the Doppers, 
among them Paul Kruger, had become known as a group imbued with an acute ethnic consciousness, strongly anti-
British, and keen to develop a distinct political, economic and social life along their own lines. From the 1850s 
onwards, the Dutch-Afrikaners in the Cape faced a twin assault on their cultural and spiritual values in the forms of 
the so-called 'liberal tendency' and intensified British cultural imperialism. Severe barriers also faced Dutch-
Afrikaners who contemplated entering central and local government which by 1875 employed some 4500 people in 
the colony. Every candidate had to be fluent in English, the only official language, and the informal system of 
patronage was dominated by English-speakers who virtually monopolized the senior ranks. Against this general 
economic background, Dutch-Afrikaners began to agitate for protectionist policies to aid farmers, a national bank to 
counter the imperial banks, and equal status for the Dutch language (Giliomee, 1989). 
 
Mobilising race for land based wealth dominance has been a long drawn century old process changing 
with development and political awareness. Thus “… accelerated economic development … widened the 
class cleavages within Dutch-Afrikaner society. At the top were the large landholders and 
commercializing farmers and the Cape Dutch in the towns, who prospered as financial agents and 
auctioneers; then came a large number of middling farmers who managed to make ends meet; and 
finally, at the bottom, there were the small farmers and bywoners. From the 1870s on a large class of 
poor and often destitute small farmers began to form. They were unable and unwilling to do anything 
but farm …” (Ibid). Some of the most desperate of these small farmers began to migrate to the towns 
where they found casual employment, but others resorted to vagrancy, begging and crime. A “… major 
development stimulating growing ethnic awareness was the rise of Dutch-Afrikaner farmers' 
associations (boeren vereenigingen). During the 1870s several were formed in the north-eastern and 
eastern part of the colony. Like their English counterparts, they began as agricultural organizations but 
soon began to speak out on political issues. … Political expression of ethnic awareness was also fostered 
by the constitutions which Britain granted first to the self-governing Transvaal colony and then to the 
Union of South Africa. White manhood suffrage meant that it was in the interest of the Dutch-Afrikaner 
leaders to mobilize the bywoners behind them. And the exclusion of Africans from the franchise 
effectively ended the white landlord-African tenant and other cross-racial linkages that had grown up in 
the decade or so before the war” (Giliomee, 1989). 
 
Access to land even in settler colonial Africa has also became mobilized around “traditional” ethnic 
structures, including by urbanites not resident in the jurisdiction in which such land rights are claimed,   41
due to racial discrimination over land. Nicholas Cope (date) argues that the “…. formation of Inkatha by 
the Northern Natal petty bourgeoisie was [intended] to enable them to cooperate with rural chiefs in the 
purchase and development of land: 'Inkatha was seen as a means through which commercial agriculture 
could be set underway on land purchased ostensibly by a "tribe", since non-tribal land-buying syndicates 
had been practically outlawed following the 1913 (Natives Land) Act.' Albert Luthuli purportedly 
revived the Groutville Cane Growers' Association and founded the Natal and Zululand Bantu Cane 
Growers' Association, to foster the interests of the small-scale African sugar growers and negotiate on 
their behalf with millers (Marks, 1989). In 1942, when he stood for election to the Native Representative 
Council with Zulu Society support, his platform included a request to the government for 'more help to 
the rural community in their farming operations'; the establishment of 'a Land Bank for Bantus'; 
improvements in the general status of chiefs and chiefs' courts; the acquisition of land by the 
government for Africans; local government or councils in 'advanced communities' such as Edendale; the 
extension of education in rural areas; and 'more civilized salaries for black teachers” (Ibid). 
 
Countries such as South Africa and Namibia remain confronted with unequal land holdings especially 
because titled land, which is protected from expropriation by their liberal democratic post-independence 
constitutions, is mainly in the hands of a few white commercial farmers (table 4-4). In South Africa 
60,000 white farmers, who make up only 5% of the white population, own almost 87% (85,5 million) of 
the land, while only 20,000 of them produce 80% of the gross agricultural product (Moyo, 2003). A 
further 40,000, including some 2,000 black farmers, produce 15%, of output while 500,000 families 
living in the former homelands produce an estimated 5%. At least 12 million blacks inhabit 17.1 million 
hectares of land and no more than 15 % (or 2.6 million hectares) of this land is potentially arable. Thus 
whites own 6 times more land in terms of the quantity of land available and its quality (Ibid). In 
Namibia, where white settlers comprise about 8% of the total population, commercial land under 
freehold title comprises approximately 6,300 farms, which belong to 4,128 white farmers. This freehold 
title land covers 44% of available land and 70% of the most productive agricultural land, while only 2.2 
million hectares of the commercial farmlands belong to black farmers. By contrast, communal lands 
comprise 138,000 households with an area of 33.5 million hectares, which is only 41% of the land 
available.  
 
In Zimbabwe, before the fast track land reform programme, most of the freehold lands were in the hands 
of 4,500 whites (comprising 0.03% of the population) and located in the most fertile parts of the country, 
with the most favourable climatic conditions and water resources. White farmers controlled 31% of the   42
country’s freehold land or about 42% of the agricultural land including 75% of prime lands, while 1.2 
million black families subsisted on 41% of the country’s area of 39 million hectares (Ibid). After 16 
years of pursuing a market –based (willing-seller willing –buyer) approach to land, which redistributed 
less than 25% of white controlled land  (including the more marginal lands they held) at high prices, the 
Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) resorted to compulsory land acquisition methods in 1997 using new 
expropriation laws. The contestation of compulsory land acquisition laws by large white land owners 
and the failure of the GoZ to adopt effective legal procedures for land expropriation, as well as its failure 
to get British finance (on grounds of colonial responsibility) for speedier land acquisition, led the GoZ to 
adopt a more radical approach to land transfer. In a context of economic and political crisis, from 2000 a 
“fast track” land transfer programme involving extensive land occupations by thousands of people 
alongside legally based compulsory acquisition was instituted. 
Table 4-4:  Land and Population in Southern Africa 
Sources: CIA, the World Factbook, 2001; U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base 2001  
 
This led to the GoZ take over of 90% of the white lands and their allocation to over 135,000 households. 
The process was accompanied by violence  and the reduction of agricultural production by over 30% of 
normal output. Zimbabwe’s economy  thus deteriorated further and the country remains isolated by the 
international community on grounds of both its land reform approach and negative governance practises 
associated with the land reform and electoral competition since 2000. Secondary land conflicts , 
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Angola  12 4670.0  31167.5   81  10 145 267  1 
Botswana    60 037.0  28217.39  26  1 576 470  4 est. (White & Kgalagadi = 7%) 
D.R. of 
Congo 
234 541.0    23454.1  222  51 964 999  9 
Lesotho      3 035.5    2337.34  706  2 143 141  0.3 
Malawi      9 400.0    6 400.0  1 104  10 385 849  0.06 
Mauritius         186.0    102.3.0   6 341  1 179 368  Indo, Sino & Franco - Mauritian 
Mozambique     79 938.0  41 056.89     201  17 700 000  0.06 Euro, 0.08 Indians 
Namibia    82 541.8  38 794.65      21  1 771 327  6 
South Africa  121 991.2  95 153.14    356  43 421 021  13.6 W, 2.6Indian 
Swaziland      1 736.3     1 267.5    624  1 083 289  3 
Seychelles        45.5.0         6.83  1 743  79 326  Seychellois (mix of African, 
Euro, Asians) 
Tanzania    94 508.7  48 710.0     374  35 306 126  1 
Zambia    75 261.4  35 372.86    127  9 582 418  1.1 
Zimbabwe    39 058.0  32027.56    290  11 342 521  0.8 
Totals  926 950.4  117 313.0    197 681 122     43
According to Sihlongonyane (2003), in spite of an orderly official land redistribution process in South 
Africa, on the other hand, land policy and conflict over land have been driven since the late 1980s by 
illegal land occupation which affected all its major cities and has involved close to 3 million squatters in 
shanty peri-urban township. Interestingly some scholars argue that in South Africa women benefited 
most from land occupations, especially in the rural areas (Cross, 1999), because their subordinate 
position within traditional structures of chiefdom inhibits their access to land and its natural resources.  
 
Indeed between 1994 and 2000, South Africa’s official market friendly land redistribution approach had 
only transferred 780,407 hectares to 55,383 disadvantaged households, some 14% of which were women 
(Sihlongonyane, 2003), and by 2003 redistributed  land amounted to less than 2% of the agricultural 
land  The official Integrated Program of Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development (IPLRAD) 
now aims to transfer 30% of ‘medium and high quality agricultural land to blacks over 15 years (Ibid).  
The extent of such a slow redistributive process can be sustained by South Africa, in a context where 
unemployment is close to 40% and GDP growth (and industrial progress) averages below 3%, is yet to 
be seen.  
 
The Zimbabwe lesson of the inefficacy of market based approaches and the protection of inherited 
legacies of racially unequal land distribution, as well as the negative effects of the “fast track” approach, 
suggest the need for rethinking the South African and Namibian land reform strategies.  
 
Gender discrimination in land rights is another source of land conflict typical in most of Africa. Though 
women constitute the majority of the population in most countries (e.g. in East Africa -Kenya 50.5%, 
Tanzania 51% and Uganda 52%) and women are critical to the agricultural economy, they enjoy limited 
land rights (Lumumba, 2003). For instance in Kenya less than 4% of women have title deeds to land 
registered in their names compared to 7% in Uganda and 10% in Tanzania (Ibid). And, according to 
May  et al. (1995), women … in South Africa … [face the most severe]… spatial and economic 
marginalization [among] rural African women… [because] … women, who have the primary 
responsibility for household reproduction, … have limited direct title or control of land. “Such access to 
land rights is only through their husbands or families. Cross (1999) argues that ‘land access is closely 
defended by power structures and is key to the institutional processes that determine what women can 
and cannot do with resources in the support of their households, [while] customary tenure systems are 
… deteriorating, as corrupt administrators and developers, on the one hand, and widening divisions 
within communities, on the other, fail to enforce accountable land rights” (Cross, 1997; Cross et al. 
1996). In this context, access to land by unauthorized occupations provides women with the opportunity   44
to meet a variety of household needs, including those that are socially identified as being the 
responsibility of women (Bryceson, 1995). This gender based land grievance demonstrates how deeply 
rooted land conflicts can be, even if the land question tends to be manipulated by male politicians. 
 
Socio-economic dominance around commerce and minerals 
The ethnic and racial basis of socio-economic dominance and conflict in Africa stretches beyond its 
primary land resource and resource and social mobility through jobs and education to the control of 
minerals and commerce in Africa’s uneven enclave economy. In general Africa has witnessed much 
more broadly based struggles between “foreign” and indigenous elites and business people for wealth 
accumulation and dominance, through competition for land, minerals and commercial activity, during 
and after colonialisation. For instance, “ … early tolerance in the Belgian Congo of the small mercantile 
careers of 'foreigners' by the dominant political powers provided opportunities for their growth, as did 
also the preference of western big businesses for 'foreigners' as their local agents (Jewssiewicki, 1989). 
This early attitude, “… underpinned by fears of the development of a local national black bourgeoisie, 
was transformed during the industrialization of the 1920s … by nearly open hostilities … [and]… a rise 
in popular resentment of 'the exploiters' and by the fragmentation of these 'exploiters' into smaller 
groups, who pursued the only avenue open to outcasts, small businesses began after Independence (in 
1960) offered marginalized businessmen the opportunities of a huge market, which, they rapidly 
monopolized (Ibid), using ethnic mobilisation strategies. For example: 
“Small businessmen, grouped in ethnic communities or family arrangements, replaced the more formal credit 
institutions and the supply systems which were previously inaccessible. Because of their unique position as the sole 
people 'institutionally' equipped to confront the collapse of the country's economic system and to tackle the reeling 
state apparatus, they reaped profits. But they also paid dearly for it later, when they were caught between growing 
popular resentment, which was fed by the economic crisis of the 1970s, and the mounting hostility manifested 
towards them by the state's bureaucrats who themselves were hoping to invest in commercial activities. Altogether 
removed from political circles, and thus possessing no political influence, they were relatively easily eliminated 
from the national scene in the 1970s, expelled gradually as 'undesirables'” Jewssiewicki, 1989.  
 
The struggle to control commerce in Africa has for long been predominantly a racially shaped conflict as 
indigenes compete with Asians, Lebanese, Whites and Arabs. The notable cases of such include, former 
settler colonies, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Sudan etc. This has led to extreme measures to bring balance. 
 
However reverse racially based discrimination based upon a broad concept of affirmative action has 
been experienced in Africa. For example, Malawi practices racial discrimination since discrimination 
against Malawi’s Asian population is enshrined in legislation. Malawi has 5,000 Asians, who are mainly 
engaged in the import and export and retail trade.  
“By law Asian residents and citizens can only own property in the four towns of Lilongwe, Blantyre, Zomba, and 
Mzuzu. In 1986 changes in the citizenship law meant that holders of foreign passports could no longer live   45
indefinitely in Malawi –a measure particularly aimed against Asians, many of whom hold British passports. Asians 
have been particular targets of forfeiture Act, which allows the government to seize the property of anyone, 
suspected of economic crimes. This is an executive action with no right of appeal to a judicial authority-not a 
sentence imposed by the court. Apart from being an extraordinary severe penalty, its imposition is contrary to 
international standards, as well being almost invariably applied in a racially discriminatory manner” (Where Silence 
Rules The Suppression of Dissent in Malawi human Rights Watch, 1990). 
 
In a variety of African countries state based control and distribution of mineral resources and related 
rents and services have been a major strategy used to mobilize socio-economic and political dominance, 
and a key source of ethno-regional wealth differentials and struggles over resource control. Various 
countries most affected by this include Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, Sudan, DRC, South Africa, etc. 
 
For example, the discovery of oil and its subsequent exploitation became the major source of  post-
independence conflict in Sudan with the  government annexing oil bearing lands to the north of Sudan 
within a Unitary state created against southerners (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002). Thus while the 
government of Sudan considers oil as a national (state) resource the southerners consider the oil a 
southern resource, and access to and control of petroleum wealth is critical to the sustained Sudanese 
civil war, and in maintaining the control and resources enjoyed by the government and residents in the 
north (Ibid). Moreover environmental impacts of oil exploration and production have grown with serious 
social consequences (Ibid) for the poorest mainly of rural and southern stock, thus emphasizing how 
both ethnic and racial difference have been mobilized in southern and northern Sudan towards socio-
economic dominance and exclusion largely against the south, and that external foreign interest have 
abetted this process and pattern. 
 
However the worst ethnic conflicts over socio-economic dominance seems to occur in those African 
countries and within those regions of high mineral potential. For example, the best soils and minerals 
resources of the DRC tend to be located in peripherimeter of the country, hence the distribution of 
population and conflict in these border zones. For instance the Kivu provinces, “… which have been 
under rebel control during 1998-2002, ranks among the most productive regions in Africa. The region is 
indeed a critical supplier of water, energy, food and arable land. Most farmers can yield up to three 
harvests a year ... [and] would … probably be in a better shape had it not been known for its minerals 
(including coltan), as it has now become the target of extensive, though illegal, natural resource 
exploitation within the framework of a wider conflict system involving a myriad of actors and interest” 
(Moyroud and Katanga, 2002). Ethnic and inter-state conflicts and war dominate this region. 
 
Sierra Leone, which in addition to having diamonds worth over US$200 million output per year, has 
rutile, (a titanium ore) used for paint pigment and welding rod coatings, which has been mined since   46
1979 by Sierra Rutile Limited (Sepdata, 2002). This is wholly owned by Nord Resources of the United 
States, which began commercial mining operations near Bonthe in early 1979 being the largest non-
petroleum U.S. investment in West, Africa) and exports 88,000 tons valued at US$75 million in 1990. 
Rutile and bauxite mining operations were suspended when rebels invaded the mining sites in 1995 but 
negotiations for the reactivation of rutile and bauxite mining are in progress, although the U.S. interest 
in the company has been reduced to 25% (Ibid). Sierra Leone however relies heavily on significant 
amounts of foreign assistance, including the United States, Italy, and Germany, the largest being the 
United Kingdom and the European Union, and multilateral agencies (Ibid). 
 
The complex manner in which national and international alliances over resource control gains dramatic 
expression in ethnic exclusion and dominance is best illustrated by the Nigerian delta region and the 
control of oil and related resources (Box 4-3). Neither federalism nor ethnic balancing of resources has 
been able to avert ethnic conflict and poverty. The limited effort by international capital and “northern” 
governments to redress these conflicts is critical in any discourse on African ethnic conflict. 
Box 4-3 
LAGOS, Nigeria Ethnic clashes in an oil-rich area of Nigeria have left eight people dead, including an employee of Chevron 
Texaco, officials said Tuesday. The clashes between ethnic Ijaws and Itsekiris came as the country prepared for presidential 
elections. The campaign for the vote, set for next month, has already been marred by political violence. Ijaw official Alhaji 
Dokubo-Asari said Tuesday Ijaws were increasingly angry at the government and Itsekiris, accusing the two groups of 
working together to create voting boundaries that are unfavorable to the Ijaws.The Ijaws, with 8 million people, are the 
largest ethnic group in the oil-rich Niger Delta. They accuse Nigeria and multinational companies of unfairly favoring 
smaller, rival tribes with lucrative contracts and development projects. The latest violence started when Ijaws raided two 
Itsekiri villages Monday, torching homes. Most of those killed were women and children who were unable to flee, resident 
Tuoyo Ineh said by telephone.An unidentified catering worker for Chevron Texaco was hit by a stray bullet and died 
Tuesday, company executive Sola Omole said in a statement. Another Chevron Texaco worker was injured, the statement 
said. One Shell contract worker was missing and feared dead, a Shell official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. A 
Shell spokesman said he could not immediately confirm the account. On March 12, Ijaw militants traded fire with 
government troops in a village near the oil port of Warri, where several oil multinationals are based. Seven people, including 
five civilians and two soldiers, were killed in that clash. The latest casualties bring to at least 15 the number of people killed 
since the fighting erupted last week. Chevron was not a direct target of the bloodletting, Omole said, describing the dispute as 
a "political protest" that "degenerated into inter-ethnic feuding.” Boatloads of Nigerian troops and armored vehicles were 
seen heading for the conflict-torn area Tuesday. On Monday, Shell shut down three oil pipeline stations, bringing to five the 
number of facilities closed. Chevron Texaco said its production was not affected by the violence. A number of civilians 
fleeing fighting had taken refuge at Chevron Texaco’s main Escravos export terminal, the company said. "We have begun to 
evacuate the displaced people ... to a more conducive location, where their immediate needs can be better addressed," the 
company statement said. The previous decade has seen an upsurge of violence in the Niger Delta, a desperately poor region 
of swamps and rivers, where nearly all the country's oil is drilled. With production of 2 million barrels of crude a day, Nigeria 
is the world's sixth-largest oil producer and fifth-largest supplier to the United States.  
(Source: Associated Press Wednesday, March 19, 2003) 
4.2.3 Access to Social Services 
The mobilisation of ethnicity and race for socio-economic dominance through the control of jobs, 
education, land, minerals and commerce, has led to differential shares of various social services. Access 
to social services in Africa tends to be ethno-regionally differentiated by culture and language as 
instruments of ethnic identity.    47
 
Language has always been a critical instrument form mobilizing socio-economic dominance, via 
education, job opportunity and market incorporation and as a tool to enforce political dominance via 
notions of the originality of given groups. In the DRC for example: 
 “…beginning with the schooling of catechists and the fixing of a written language, originally for purposes of 
evangelization, a conceptualized model of a Luba 'language' was established with Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries creating two different standards of its written form. At the same time, a new Luba culture was created 
through the process of selection of various local, cultural elements as appropriate. This process was encouraged by 
the fact that… in Christianized villages, where the socialization and cultural conditioning processes which 
accompanied the creation of a wage-earning class were strongly felt, the Kasai region as a whole continued to be 
prey to black and white predators alike until the 1920s. For the 'protected' people the way was thus paved for future 
receptivity, by both individuals and the collectivity, to the wage system, agricultural production for the market and 
formal schooling, together with the conversion of the children to Christianity and values associated with it. … Thus 
the Luba, who already were seen as stout, hard-working and intelligent collaborators, found themselves being 
offered, rather forcefully perhaps, three quite 'untraditional, opportunities: (1) wage-remunerated work in the mining 
region, at a time, during the 1920s, when working conditions in Industrial Upper Katanga (Haut-Katanga Industries) 
were improving considerably; (2) cash-crop agriculture in the new villages lining the Bukama-Port Franqui railway; 
and (3) school education in the missionary-codified written Luba language” (Roberts, 1989). 
  
A complex array of dominance producing factors and varied ethnic distributional action resulted from 
the ethno-regional development focus which hung on language policy and schooling (Roberts, 1989). It 
is thus crucial to recognise that the mobilisation of dominance has mostly been constructed within 
spatial framework in which social and economic policy is used to construct political organisation based 
on ethnic identity and unequal opportunity. In the DRC, regionalism as a political force grew before 
1930 and became a specifically Katangese collective identity because of the policies of the white 
Katanga society and through the manipulation of African resentment-in large part that of the Lunda-over 
the successes of the Luba in being integrated into colonial structures (Jewssiewicki, 1989). This means 
that  
“… regionalism is a form of political articulation of collective identities in societies where national integration in the 
form of the complete mobility of the workforce and of capital is only a gradually realized event. Ethnic 
identification and awareness would then be a type of political framework belonging to societies where wage-
remunerated migrant labour and non-economic management of the workforce and the means of production are 
dominant. It would, in this view, be a form of white political management, but it would be a form of African internal 
control over the city-country space for as long as the social autonomy of the cities and the capitalization of 
agriculture had yet to be accomplished.” (Jewssiewicki, 1989) 
 
It has been argued that the specifically ethnic politicization of social change in Africa since the 1950s 
and its continuation afterwards may be explained by several factors:  
“(1) the authoritarian nature of the colonial state and its absence from any local social involvement; (2) the 
fundamental racial division underlying colonial society and the existence in the Congo of a political culture of race; 
(3) the fundamentally uneven growth of the colonial economy which was intensified in the 1950s; (4) the internal 
necessity for the dominant groups within African society of containing the economic emancipation of women and 
youth that was based on the increasing monetization of society; and (5) a tentative and ambiguous convergence of 
the interests of the 'traditional' rural elite and 'modern' urban elites.” (Jewssiewicki, 1989). 
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This trend has tended to be institutionalized among the African elite by the growth of “modern” forms of 
civic organisations, such as “… the growing political role of associations of graduates and former 
students from which the future political leaders sprang” (Jewssiewicki, 1989), emphasized which had 
specific ethno-regional dimensions. The expression of this in the regionally uneven access to social 
services (health; literacy; social welfare; potable water; food support etc) is a recurrent cause for ethnic 
based struggles for state resources and services redistribution. [More] 
 
Unequal access to social services and infrastructure in South Africa is grossly inequitable, since the 
former apartheid government prioritized facility provision for the white population at the expense of 
black communities confined to ‘homelands’ and townships (Country profile, South Africa). Black 
people at 75% of the population, still receive only 35% of national income, while fifty-seven per cent of 
black people live below the poverty line, compared with only 2.1% of white people (Ibid). 
 
While the data is weak on social access differentials, the access to health services in Kenya on a 
provincial basis tend to imply that some ethnic groups in given provinces generally attain socio-
economic dominance (Table 4-5).  
Table 4-5: Health Institutions by Province Kenya, 1990 
Province Hospitals  Health  Centers 
Health sub-centers 
and Dispensaries 
Nairobi 31  18  139 
Coast 26  32  162 
Eastern 42  43  223 
North-Eastern 3  6  31 
Central 44  46  234 
Rift Valley  61  65  357 
Nyanza 42  49  254 









Source: Economic Survey, 1991 
 
While statistics on ethnic shares of social service access are limited, data on the provincial distribution 
of health services is frequently aligned somewhat with ethnicity (Table 4-6) in Zimbabwe.  
4.3 External (international) dimensions of accumulation, power and resources control 
The fact that colonial governance systems and policies promoted ethnic and racial socio-economic 
dominance through specific models of structuring state power, ethnic identity and resources allocations 
has been established. The continued importance of external neo-colonial forces in fostering  ethnic and 
race based socio-economic dominance, exclusion and conflict tends however to be underplay by 
dominant discourses which instead focus on “internalist” perspectives which argue that African ethnic   49
primordial tendencies are central to the socio-political implosion and conflict in Africa, whose weak 
governance systems are essentialised as having atomistic tendencies. While internal mobilisation of 
ethnicity for socio-economic dominance has been critical, external factors remain critical. 
Table 4-6: Medical Institution by Province, 1999 
Region Hospitals  Clinic  Total 
Manicaland 56  206  262 
Mashonaland 
Central 
26 103  129 
Mashonaland East  34  160  194 
Mashonaland West  33  129  162 
Matebeleland North  26  73  99 
Matebeleland South  29  84  113 
Midlands 57  177  234 
Masvingo 43  133  176 
Harare 2  52  54 
Chitungwiza 1  4  5 
Bulawayo 3  18  21 
Total 2001  310  1139  1449 
 
The external forces of concern in the genesis and reproduction of socio-economic dominance can be 
found in both “northern” state governance interventions and economic interactions with Africa as well 
as in Africa sub-regional or neighbouring states interventions in various African states. The latter 
process is most prominent in some countries such as the DRC, Liberia, Rhodesia, Nigeria, Mozambique, 
Angola etc where inter-state conflict has been extreme, while the former is more generalized in Africa, 
albeit more prominent in the mineral resource rich African states. But different sets of issues, interest 
and events define the incidence and character of the external forces which shape the problems of ethnic 
dominance, exclusion and conflict.  
 
For example, whereas ethnic clashes were not new to the Kivus region of the DRC, sub-regional or 
neighbouring state interventions have attempted to shape ethnic dominance patterns there through 
regional armed conflict for long (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002). Thus “… during the early 1990s a 
number of clashes had occurred along the eastern border between Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, 
primarily between communities of Tutsi origin (Banyamulenge) resident in the DRC and local 
communities of other ethnic origins but the DRC internal conflict dynamics were reinforced by the 
influx of the large number of Rwandan refugees and armed Hutus, exacerbating tension between Hutus 
and Tutsis of south of Kivu” (Ibid). Many localized conflicts between various communities (such as 
Hema/Lendu/Ngiti in the Orientale province) also emerged, and the announced restrictions on the people 
of Tutsi descent-who had lived in the DRC for generations –acted as a major triggering event and 
provided the opportunity to recruit an armed rebel movement that galvanized the Tutsis and other groups   50
in opposition to Mobutu’s unpopular government in Kinshasa (Ibid). Rwandan military forces 
prominently provided aid and direction to the rebellion that included Tutsis and other discontent groups, 
given that its primary objective was to enter the eastern DRC and eliminate Interharamwe and ex-FAR 
forces (Ibid). While the conflict in the DRC was originally focused on the east, it developed into a 
national war which overthrew Mobutu and then in 1998 to fighting in the northern, eastern and western 
parts of the DRC, between the Congolese forces under Laurent Kabila and several rebel factions (Ibid). 
 
This escalation and regionalization of conflict and polarization in the central Africa region became a 
source of ethnic and inter-state mobilisation of dominance over access and use of mineral and other 
resources. The rebels’ stated case was corruption, cronyism and nepotism in Kabila’s regime, but the 
relation between Kabila and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda had turned sour over the 
ostensible persistence of Interharamwe rebel movements in the eastern Congo, and the loss of 
entrenched resource exploitation opportunities by these neighbours and foreign northern governments. 
By the late 1990, the DRC however had acquired a new balance of power divided into zones of external 
in military control and resource exploitations. (Ibid). Countries which supported the DRC (Angola and 
Zimbabwe in particular) became part of this national partition. This strategy of internal-external 
alliances provided a framework for a socio-economic dominance structure founded on ethno-regional 
politicization and foreign resource extraction and trade. The sources of the overall Great Lakes conflict 
are structural and relate to external interests.  
 
In particular the external demand for, coltan a combination of Columbium- tantalite 80% of the reserves 
of which are found in the DRC (which forms of the basis of high-tech global commodity chain) has 
become one of the driving forces behind the war in the DRC and the presence of rival militias (Moyroud 
and Katanga, 2002). 
 
Countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia have seen the mobilisation by ethnically based 
groups of rebellions, which have been financed by mineral and resources exploitation (diamonds, timber 
etc), and in which international trade has been critical. [More] 
4.4 Some Gender dimensions 
The results of ethnic and racial mobilisation for dominance in Africa have distinctly gendered patterns, 
which are not well documented, largely because the discourse on ethnic and racial socio-economic 
dominance tends to be weak on the gender dimensions of the inequalities and repression that accompany   51
ethnic and race differentiation processes. As it is, “… ethnicity has been implicitly recognized until now 
as strictly a matter involving men, because, according to the patriarchal model, men transmitted only 
identity to their offspring (Jewssiewicki, 1989). This was apparently so because the indigène in colonial 
society was excluded from the Napoleonic Code and could legally convey no property to his 
descendants (Ibid). A more accurate hypothesis would suggest, however, that men, as the only 
recognized wage-earners in colonial society, transmitted class position to other men (Ibid) As, despite 
massive evidence demonstrating it, the real proletarianization of women was never recognized by either 
colonial legislation or historians (Ibid). African women transmitted a legal status of 'native', the basis of 
which lay in race.  
 
Yet gender has been a major instrument used to mobilise dominance seeking actions. Cultural identity 
and language are critical to the whole process of African socialization, and have been “… transmitted by 
women and peer groups (children and adolescents of the streets, neighbourhoods and compounds) which 
formed according to principles we have not yet learned and whose impact on the reproduction of the 
expressed identity we are unable to determine” (Jewssiewicki, 1989). Schools mobilised “wage-class 
socialization and status-related (racial) identity”, among natives, and most schools were located in the 
church (Ibid). This type of socialization (underpinned by patriarchal values) has been central to the 
reproduction of the political system, as well as for the political culture of ethnicity” (Ibid), using 
motherhood as the central channel. Yet women suffer the brunt of such differential dominance. 
 
Employment discrimination by race in South Africa affected blacks and ‘coloureds’ women in ways 
which entrenched gendered inequity. For instance, when women “… increasingly entered farm wage 
labour in their own rights, they did so mainly as irregular or casual agricultural workers. [However]…. 
labour laws had excluded these two main sectors of African  women’s activity from legal organisation 
and bargaining, protective legislation ,workmen’s compensation etc reinforced women’s vulnerability 
and powerlessness. [Thus] “... domestic services and farm labour … employed significant numbers of 
‘Coloured’ women in the Cape (Table 4-6) [such that] in 1970 they constituted almost 70% [and] 
between 10.2-11.2% of this total sector in the Cape and the country [respectively]. .... Conditions of 
service were ... extremely poor and wages extremely low. [Moreover] ... employers and/or the system … 
often used measures to divide the two blacks and coloureds] groups, [including the dichotomies of rural 
(illegal)/urban, African/Coloured, in their deliberate choices of domestic workers as a strategy to divide 
and rule and hence control these workers at the individual level” (Casaburri, 1989). Racial 
discrimination in employment along gender lines was most apparent in South Africa, where statistical 
evidence is most available (Table 4-7).   52
 
Table 4-7: Percentage of domestic servants by race and sex in eleven principal urban areas in 
South Africa 
African White  Coloured  Asian  Urban area 
  female male  female  male  female male  female male 
Cape Town  20.3  4.2        68.5  4.2       
Port Elizabeth  72.8  5.3        20.9  0.8       
East London  89  8.3        2.5  0.3       
Kimberly   70.4  12.4        14.9  2.3       
Natal              0.3  0.3       
Pietmaritzburg  65.8  33                   
Durban  59.5  38.8                   
Transval                         
Pretoria  77.1  20.3        2.3  0.3       
Bloemfontein  80.8  14.8        3.7  0.7       
Vaal Triangle  84.3  13.5        2.2          
OFS Goldfields  85.6  11.7        1.8  0.9       
Source: South African Department of Statistics  
 
Gender discrimination on racial grounds was also institutionalised in the manufacturing sector in South 
Africa where “...  female employment in the manufacturing sector remained constant at 15-16% between 
1946 and 1960 and it had increased… by 1976 to 21%. [there was] decline in the occupation of white 
females and the relative constancy of coloured females ….” (Casaburri, 1989). Since these jobs were the 
more menial types. 
Table 4-8: Female wage employees in manufacturing 
Year  1946 1951 1960 1976 
Population  group    a b  a b  a b  a b 
Asians  1 0  2 0  3 1  10 2 
Africans  5 1  8 1  17 2  36 8 
coloured  36 1  39 6  40 6  34 4 
whites  58 9  51 8  40 6  20 4 
Total  100 16  100 15  100 15  100 21 
NB: column b indicate female employment as a % of total manufacturing  
Source: Based on Occupational Census 1936, in U.G. November 12, 1942 
Domestic work was thus reserved for blacks and coloureds while the whites and Asians had greater 
access to secretarial and clerical work in various institutions, reinforcing the hierarchy of gender and 
class discrimination through education and employment.  
 
The racial and gender differential in employment of senior levels (Director General to Government 
Administrator and related managerial categories) demonstrates the top end of such discrimination (Table 
4-9).  
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These differential patterns of socio-economic dominance appear over time to have exacerbated major 
Africa conflicts as we briefly discuss next. 
Table 4-9: Racial and Gender Breakdown of Senior Positions, 1991 
Gender White  Colored Indian  Black  Total 
Male 6641  (91,  5%)  45  43 185  6914 
Female  323 9 (4, 45%)  2  9  10  344 (4, 74%) 
Total  6964 (95, 9%)  47  52  195  7258 (100%) 
Source: Business Day, Wednesday, November 6, 1991. (Mokgoro, 1994) 
4.5 Resource conflicts, ethnicity and race 
Having assessed the ethnic/racial socio-economic dominance patterns in Africa, an attempt is made to 
“correlate” ethnicity with some of the key conflicts. The aim is decipher whether socio-economic 
dominance, associated with the control of key resources, explains such conflicts. This analysis is limited 
to those countries where “visible” conflicts have emerged, given the limitations of existing data on 
conflicts and resource shares. 
 
At least 15 sub-Saharan African countries have experienced major resource based conflicts with an 
ethnic dimension to it as shown below (Chart 4-1). By far the greatest number of these conflicts entail 
struggles over high value minerals (diamonds, oil, gold etc), while land countries feature in many other 
countries. 
 
As mentioned earlier most of the conflicts are regionally focused given the site-specific endowment of 
mineral resources, as well as the competition for specific arable lands located in particular regions of 
these countries. In general inward migration to such zones for agricultural settlement, employment or 
mineral resource extraction has tended to escalate competition for the scarce resource or for the 
relatively small share of the benefits allocated to local communities. Where a sharp ethnic divide exists, 
ethnicity has been mobilized in related resource conflicts, while the major share of benefits tend to be 
exported.  
 
5.0 Policy responses to Socio-economic Dominance and Exclusion 
Having examined the patterns of ethnic and racial socio-economic dominance and conflicts this section 
provides a brief assessment of selected public (state) policies and non-state actions, which have been 
adopted to redress ethnic and racial socio-economic inequalities. We discuss these experiences in 2 sub-  54
sections beginning first with a review of the broad conceptual and contextual framework within which 
such interventions have tended to be applied, and then by present case studies of the interventions, and 
then summarise the lessons. 
5.1 Framework and context of responses 
African experiences with redressing the political and socio-economic imbalances arising from ethnic and 
racial dominance and exclusion are varied in terms of the problem definition, approaches used to deliver 
redress, the nature of institutions and participants involved in the responses, the results achieved and the 
context within which responses are crafted or emerge. 
Chart 4-1: Major Conflicts in Africa: Resources and Ethnicity 
Country  Presence of conflict (Yes/No)  Level  Resource Conflict  Ethnic Conflict 
Angola   Yes  National  Minerals   Yes 
Burundi   Yes  National  Land/(Power)  Yes 
Chad   Yes  Local  Minerals   ? 
Condo Republic   No  National  Oil   ? 
Cote d’Ivoire   Yes  National  Land   Yes 
DRC   Yes  Regional  Minerals   Yes 
Eritrea   Yes  Regional  Border dispute/ Land   Yes 
Ethiopia   Yes  Regional  Border/ Land   Yes 
Kenya   Yes  Regional  Land/ Power  Yes 
Liberia   Yes  National  Minerals   Yes 
Nigeria   Yes  Regional  Mineral/ Land   Yes 
Rwanda   Yes  National  Land/ Power   Ye s 
Sierra Leone   Yes  National  Mineral/ Power  Yes 
Somalia   Yes  National  Mineral/ Power   Yes 
Sudan   Yes  National  Mineral/ power  Yes (race/ ethnic) 
Uganda   Yes  Regional  Land/ Power   Yes 
Zimbabwe Yes  National  Land    Race 
 
An important observation to be made about the search for lessons to be learnt and strategies that can be 
promoted to address problems of ethnic socio-economic dominance is the weakness of the conceptual 
and contextual framework of intervention discourse. Generally much of this discourse is focused on 
visible or notable country level cases where conflicts have matured and extreme violent conflict has 
emerged. Generally such that the focus of debate becomes pre-occupied with armed struggle related 
conflict management and peace-building. This pre-occupation while warranted by the dire need to 
resolve the attendant humanitarian, economic and political crises that arise in such high profile cases, 
tends to overlook the ubiquitous low profile incipient and simmering, and in many cases intra-country 
sub-regional or local level cases of conflict over dominance and exclusion. Moreover the literature while 
replete with evidence of such low profile conflicts-in-the-making has tended to underplay their long 
term implications for ethnic exclusionary processes. In this vein not only are such weak analyses and   55
intervention approaches usually a bit too little and late, but they tend to be diverted to focus on issues of 
the wider fallout of conflict and to underplay subtle processes through which dominance is built.  
 
Another preoccupation of the literature and policy on redressing African ethnic conflict is that related 
peace building interventions tend to focus on more global and systemic strategies of change centred on 
neo-liberal approaches to “governance” reforms. The recent 1990’s governance reform experience in 
Africa for instance tended to place ordinate faith in short term prescriptive efforts to “democratize” 
nations quickly, by establishing liberal political institutions such as new constitutions and multi-
partyism, without due regard for the social and economic content of the African crises. Such efforts have 
misplaced their confidence in the feasibility of political change over short time periods and /or seen the 
replication of ethnic dominance building strategies by new “pro-democracy” regimes. 
 
Frustrations with the poor results of systemic governance reforms in Africa as a tool for addressing 
extreme forms of dominance and exclusion has thus given greater currency to the higher risk political 
intervention strategies seeking rapid regime change through military intervention or armed insurrection, 
some of which is intentionally suppressed, as well as through the use of international sanctions and 
isolation as means of redress. These strategies have tended to turn most African conflict situations into 
quagmires of armed and violent political confrontation, given that the root causes of internal and 
external struggles for the control of mineral resources, land and access to limited social services and 
employment are not addressed.  
 
Thus, these approaches to redressing conflicts over socio-economic dominance, have tended to avoid 
tackling the fundamental and long term failures of economic policies and the political systems to 
accommodate and balance ethnic and racial difference and competitive resource demands. The literature 
has in this context failed to learn from  those countries which have over the long past term adapted their 
political systems and economic policies towards containing or balancing ethnic socio-economic 
dominance and exclusion (e.g. Botswana, Senegal), while underplaying the importance of recognizing 
the wide array of strategies and mechanisms that can or have been used to redress such imbalances. Our 
concern therefore in this section is to go beyond the insurrectionary and ambitious systemic governance 
and regime change approaches to redress, and to provide a few examples of how some of the more 
“reformist” responses to dominance and exclusion have fared in Africa, so as to elucidate their potentials 
and to learn from their flaws. 
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The major challenge however in discussing responses to dominance and exclusion phenomenon is the 
inter-subjectivity that informs the definition of the nature and causes of the phenomenon itself. Where 
the problem has been defined and is perceived by the actors as an organic question of tribalism per se or 
is reduced to simple formulae of ethnicisation processes of political and socio-economic dominance and 
exclusion, the tendency has been to focus on simplistic sociological panacea to the neglect of the more 
complex array of political and socio-economic factors. Thus, economic inputs into dominance patterns 
such as the effects of economic structural shifts, the inadequacy of the growing marketisation process to 
achieve resources allocation that yield equity and efficiency and the effects of negative global economic 
process (e.g. prices, market access and competitiveness) on African development and resources 
distribution tend to be underplayed. Rather the focus on the politics of ethnicity itself and political 
governance reforms take centre stage. While these are important in the arsenal of measures to respond to 
ethnic and racial dominance, it is necessary to examine a variety of policies and strategies of redress 
which go beyond ethnic or racial re-engineering in a sociological and multi-partyist sense. 
 
Our discussion below thus focuses on selected experiences with strategies or measures used to redress 
ethnic and racial imbalances such as: the role that constitutionalism in the context of multi-partyism has 
been used to address ethnic grievances; how negotiated settlements based on reconciliation and 
accommodation have been a growing mechanism for redress; how political power sharing processes 
through various mechanisms such as federalism, regional government and decentralization have been 
used to create a framework for resources distribution; specific measures of ethnic balancing used as a 
means to attain balanced allocation of resources quotas in aspects such as jobs, political position, 
education, state contracts and natural resources (including land); specific resources redistribution 
programmes such as land redistribution; and the use of indigenisation and affirmative action 
programmes, which in the African context are intended to empower mainly the majority indigenous 
business interests vis-à-vis minority control of wealth by white settlers and foreign multinational firms. 
 
In discussing strategies and mechanisms of redress it is critical to note that a variety of types of 
institutions or organisations have tended to be involved. These range from formal national state or 
government structures to international or multi-lateral inter-governmental interventions and local and 
national multi-stakeholder and non-state (e.g. NGOs, local peace committees) interventions. In addition 
responses to ethnic socio-economic imbalance include formal policy advocacy activities by a variety of 
institutions (community, NGO, multi-lateral etc) as well as non-formal and even illegal self provisioning 
tactics (land occupation, resource poaching, the market exit option/parallel markets), including also legal 
confrontational tactics (mass-action, boycotts etc). In general a combination of these forces, together at   57
times with the effects of armed insurrection, have tended to contribute towards the creation of an 
environment conducive to the adoption of the various responses discussed next. 
5.2 Strategies used to redress ethnic and racial imbalances 
5.2.1 Constitutionalism and multiparty electoral change 
In general the majority of African states since the 1990’s have attempted to use constitutional reforms in 
a context of multiparty elections to redress imbalances which have ethnic roots. These efforts have 
tended to be bedevilled by the opportunism of new regimes steeped in the logic of quick resource 
accumulation by new ruling elites. These transitions have been more difficult in countries with histories 
of extreme ethnic conflict.  
 
Rwanda’s present democratic transition toward a multi-party state for example remains fragile, as many 
elements continue to enhance  extremist attitudes including various behavioural acts of hatred and 
opposition and confrontation, not only between the members of different ethnic groups, but also between 
members of the same party with divergent or contradictory ambitions (Twagiramutara, 1998). In this 
context, to talk about democracy, partnership, distributive and retributive justice, equity for all 
Rwandans and self-sustained and participatory development involving all the members of the Rwandan 
community and all its national sensitivities is unrealistic (Ibid). The main gap is the absence of 
transparency within all sections of the population and the limited individual and collective freedom of 
press and association, and of mechanisms to safeguard the chances of the disadvantaged gaining access 
the to opportunities (jobs, etc). Constitutionalism has not developed adequate individual and collective 
measures to prevent the institutionalisation of privilege and to encourage open competition based on 
talent, competence and ability (Ibid). In this respect ideologies, policies and practices that contribute to 
encouraging, maintaining and strengthening tendencies of exclusion and, discrimination between people 
of different ethnicity and region have not been eschewed (Ibid). 
 
The use of constitutional reforms as a framework for addressing ethnic and racial imbalance, through the 
protection of specific rights and inherited unequal property, and measures against discrimination has 
perhaps been best tried in South Africa. The approach which focuses on regulating public institutions is 
notable as they “… are legally required in terms of the Constitution of the Republic South Africa Act 
(Act 108 of 1996) to enhance and promote effective and efficient management of resources through 
cost-effective and sustainable delivery of services to all South Africans irrespective of their ethnic or 
cultural backgrounds. A series of legislative measures promulgated since the introduction of the 1993   58
Interim Constitution attempt to deal with potential and anticipated ethnic conflicts in both the public and 
private domains. For example, the Employment Equity Act, (Act 55 of 1998), Skills Development Act, 
(Act 32 of 2000) and White Paper on Transformation of the Public Sector of 1995. The most profound 
implications of these Acts is at the implementation phase whereby policy implementers are reluctant to 
give effect to these policies. Ethnic conflicts in the public sector are sometimes unbearable and therefore 
forces government to intervene because some managers are deliberately ignoring the implementation of 
government policies (Giliomme, 1998). 
5.2.2 Negotiated settlements: reconciliation and accommodation 
The search for negotiated settlements as a means of resolving conflicts steeped in racial and ethno-
regional conflict has been increasing in the last decade since the successful political transitions 
experienced in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and others. The experience of these efforts have 
been... 
 
Attempts at national reconciliation across racial, tribal and regional lines were first really seen in 
Zimbabwe, where in 1980 Mugabe’s government pronounced: 
“I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new pledge, forget our grim past, forgive 
others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, 
tribalism and regionalism and work to reconstruct and rehabilitate our economic machinery”.  
This reconciliation approach lasted for 20 years, while black-black conflict grew. Later, some attempt at 
ethnic balancing in political position was after unity between rival ethnic parties in 1989 (Table 4-10), 
but this has not diminished allegations of ethnic resource mobilisation since then. Instead the conflict 
shifted to white-black struggles over land, and continued allegations of Shona dominance in the socio-
economy. 
 
Attempts to use negotiated settlement in recent times have occurred at the regional level in the DRC, 
Sierra Leone, etc. Following over six years of armed conflict in the DRC for example the central African 
region is characterised by the lack of effective regional conflict resolution mechanisms. Various ad hoc  
and informal diplomatic mediation initiatives to end what had become an unprecedented regional 
conflict had emerged (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002). In 1998 a peace initiatives aimed to establish a 
ceasefire came directly from outside central Africa from such diverse actors as the OAU, Libya, or the 
NGO Sant’Egidio and the SADC. In July 1999, the Congolese government, rebel groups and the states, 
which had been supporting the various Congolese sides, signed the SADC, led Lusaka Accords. This   59
agreement was followed by 18 months of deadlock and continued armed engagement between its 
signatories, which came to an end with the assassination of Kabila on 16 January 2001 (Ibid). The 
international community immediately adopted the strategy that recognized the new president, and 
invited him to break with the policies of his father and to implement the Lusaka Accords, and to join the 
inter-Congolese dialogue facilitated by Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of Botswana, as well as to 
accommodate the deployment of UN military observers’ mission for the DRC (MONUC) (Ibid). Only 
once Thabo Mbeki of South Africa secured an agreement on 20 July 2002 between Kabila and Rwandan 
leader Paul Kagame did the Lusaka Accords resurrect to pave the way for an inclusive negotiated 
settlement, (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002) which by now coordinated the inputs of all national, African 
and international efforts to mediate. 
Table 4-10: the top ten leaders of the new ZANU (PF) 
Position Name  Ethnic  Group  Former  Party 
President  Robert Mugabe  Shona (Zezuru)  ZANU 
CO-Vice President  Simon Muzenda Shona  (Karanga)  ZANU 
CO-Vice President  Joshua Nkomo Ndebele(Kalanga)  ZAPU 
National Chairman  Joseph Msika Ndebele  (Kalanga)  ZAPU 
Admin Secretary  Didymus Mutasa  Shona (Ndau)  ZANU 
Info. Secretary  Nathan Shamuyaria  Shona (Zezuru)  ZANU 
Legal Secretary  Edson Zvobgo  Shona (Karanga)  ZANU 
Labor Secretary  John Nkomo  Ndebele (Kalanga)  ZAPU 
Security Secertary  Sidney Sekeremayi Shona  (Manyika)  ZANU 
Political Commissar  Morven Mahachi  Shona (Manyika)  ZANU 
External Seceretary  Emerson Munangagwa  Shona (Karanga)  ZANU 
Production Secretary  Dumiso Dabengwa Ndebele  (Kalanga)  ZAPU 
Source: Sithole, 1998 
 
Sub-national or local level non-state efforts to mediate ethnic resource based conflicts, in the wake of 
the failure of national level governance reforms through constitutional and electoral change, are also a 
growing response in Africa. In Kenya for example, the mediation of local conflicts in an area most 
affected by tribal clashes and cattle rustling and land ownership, where the peace processes had not 
enjoyed the support of the Government nor of local politicians, was led by a non-state multi-actor forum, 
and remarkable efforts to restore peace were experienced in the Rift valley region (Peacenet-Kenya, 
2001). A sizable number of relief, advocacy and development agencies which work in this region, 
including the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission (CJPC), provincial administration, NPI/Roman Catholic, ECJP, Clean, GTZ, PACVAC,   60
SACDEP, OXFAM the media and the donors (Ibid), collaborated to resolve the problems (Ibid). Their 
approach entailed the local level analysis of the situation in affected areas and various methodologies of 
reconciling warring groups, including: the formation of self help groups, organization of mediation 
workshops, relief food programmes, formation of peace building committees (PBC), civic education, 
and the establishment of a case monitor (Ibid). Various activities were adopted to promote inter-ethnic 
interactions including: good neighbourhood groups, seminars, ball games, youth festivities, 
rehabilitating social structures (e.g. schools police posts) and emergency interactions such as the 
provision of food, resettlement facilities and, farm inputs, and the economic empowerment; women and 
youth, backed by awareness creation through posters and information updates (Ibid). However, some of 
the  shortcomings of the initiative arose as a result of: limited resources (human and financial), weak co-
ordination among the actors and mistrust between and among the affected people, peace workers and 
leaders mainly due to lack of accountability and transparency.  
 
Some international community or multilateral efforts at producing negotiated settlement have tended to 
fail because of their focus on super structural issues of political accommodation at the level of leadership 
to the neglect of the underlying but growing local level grievances and conflict over land and natural 
resources. For example, the United Nations, the EC and the Djibouti government facilitated a number of 
peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia, these failed to take root, even though some of them had 
positive impacts (Farah, Hussein and Lind, 2002). The UN tried official diplomacy by targeting directly 
the warring groups, mainly the warlords, while the EC and the Djibouti government tried unofficial 
diplomacy by targeting members of civil society (Ibid). But critically none of these initiatives 
considered the importance of land issues in the conflict or the relationship between deegan and political 
strength, resulting in continued local level conflict.  
 
The tactic of using national level judicial enquiries or commissions to mediate ethnic and race conflicts 
is perhaps the most “tried and tested” approach so far used to address ethnic and racial. But it has tended 
to have limited effect. Land commissions, chieftaincy commissions and other commissions abound. For 
example, “… a Judicial Commission of inquiry noted that the Fulani cattle grazers used their economic 
might in getting official support of the cause (Farah, Hussein and Lind, 2002). Another interesting case 
is the Zambian Luvale and Lunda case (Ibid) where judicial enquiry led to the creation of new ethnic 
districts which in the subsequent years resulted in enter-ethnic conflict between two districts. 
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But the design of efforts to resolve ethno-regional resource based conflicts which involve sub-regional 
neighbouring countries has perhaps been the most complex, and one in which the experience obtains has 
been limited as was seen in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique cases. The most striking 
experience is that of Liberia, whose crisis is entangled with the Sierra Leone crisis, where the 
application of contradictory conflict management mechanisms emerged. While Liberia agreed to a 
negotiated settlement involving the exiling of its president Charles Taylor aided and abetted by Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone followed a judicial retributive approach, aided and abetted by the international court of 
justice system. After eight years of civil strife ended in 1997 free and open presidential and legislative 
election were held. In 2001 the UN imposed sanctions on Liberian diamonds, along with an arms 
embargo and a travel ban on government officials, for Liberia’s support of the rebel insurgency in Sierra 
Leone. Renewed rebel activity has further eroded stability and economic activity. A regional peace 
initiative commenced in the spring of 2003 but was disrupted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) indictment of President Taylor on war crime charges (Sepdata, 2002). 
 
Negotiated settlements thus face the dilemma of retribution and reconciliation. The emphasis on conflict 
management efforts which entail ethnic balancing while punishing miscreants in public position, has had 
limited success in relative terms, when compared to the emergent approaches focused on “truth and 
reconciliation”. For example in Burundi, the law on public order and security was applied to arrest and 
try those members of the armed force that were charged with arbitrary repression (Davnie, Hasler and 
Spencer, 1996). This created a climate of understanding, and collaboration between the gendarmerie and 
the people to the extent that suspicion and hatred were soon to be replaced by mutual confidence. But in 
the wake of entrenched ethnic hatred and the search for full retribution extremist groups of Tutsi origin 
accused the government of setting up government with important posts given to the perceived 
perpetrator group, such as that of Prime Minster a Hutu, and some military officers attempted a coup 
which but failed (Ibid). This led to continued further ethnic conflict (Ibid). 
5.2.3 Power-sharing strategies: federalism, regional autonomy and ethnic balancing 
Most political measures used to de-escalate ethnicity and the ethnic conflict paradoxically emphasize the 
very ethnic and regional diversity. The most important tool which so far been used with relative success 
is the adoption of federalism and other consociational model of conflict resolution (Osaghae, 1992 cited 
by Oyugi, 1998). In this context, for example, various mechanisms of ethnic balancing such as the use of 
the ethnic quota allocation principle (budgets, jobs, etc), the creation of more state and local government 
authorities to represent sub-ethnic groups and other constitutional provisions that encourage cross-
cultural networks have been used to address the ethnic question in Nigeria (Ibid). However, this   62
approach to ethnic balancing in public policy so far has reflected more the desires of the ethnic fractions 
of the ruling class which compete for privilege, and not the regulation of political conflict in a 
harmonious political community (Nnoli, 1989 cited by Oyugi, 1998; Egwu, 1998). 
 
But federalism has at times been rejected at great cost in Africa. For example, the threat of demands for 
federalism and secessionism led Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to make some concessions to other pro-
federalist and pro-secessionist parties by creating regional assemblies, which were given limited 
autonomy with respect to local government, within a unitary state (Oyugi, 1998). However he soon 
abolished the Regional Assemblies on the ground that they were too expensive to run and that they had 
tended to breed disunity among people (Ibid). In the process he also promulgated several other Acts of 
Parliament in a bid to cripple all forms of opposition, which he thought, tended to promote ethnic 
conflicts. Nkrumah was able to suppress or hold in abeyance all forms of opposition and ethnic conflicts, 
which had threatened his ideology, and policy of national building (Ibid) but eventually fell to a military 
coup, which nonetheless retained the unitary state resulting in frequently changing balances of ethnic 
control. 
 
The motivation to address ethnic tensions in various ethno-regional contexts has increasingly been led 
by elites seeking to attract state investment into their rural districts of origin. One author (Papstein, 
1989) suggests for example that: “Luvale and Lunda intellectuals and civil servants, some of whom now 
hold important national positions, …..attribute …the lack of 'development' in [their] potentially rich 
agricultural area [to] ….. tribal strife and antagonism which lead the central government …. [limit its]… 
investment of resources in an area where localism [can] hinder.. [such investment]. The major locally 
perceived reason why the [ethnic conflict] issue must be settled is that this would be a first step towards 
economic development, better school and medical services, and the creation of an infrastructure which 
would allow local farmers and fishermen greater participation in the national economy” (Ibid). 
 
Attempts at ethnic and racial balancing at the level of political position and power in order to redress 
socio-economic imbalances have been the most frequently tried but unsuccessful response to 
dominance, exclusion and resultant conflicts. This is the case especially where this has been tried in a 
top-down approach and selective manner by apex leadership such as presidents and kings, who are 
interested parties, to the exclusion of the victims in the agreements.   63
5.2.4 Resource redistributive reforms 
Few efforts at radical redistribution of resources such as land which have been held along racial or 
ethnic lines have been attempted in Africa. The notable experiences include land nationalisation and 
allocation to indigenous peoples (in Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Algeria), partial land 
redistribution processes using market based land acquisition procedures (in Kenya, Zimbabwe in the 
1980’s, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana) and direct comprehensive land repossession using 
land occupations and legal expropriation instruments (in Zimbabwe since 2000). Some of these 
experiences were preceded by protracted armed struggle (Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, Algeria and 
Zimbabwe), while others were derived from negotiated independence settlements (Zambia, Swaziland). 
The major tension with resource redistribution strategies has tended to be the relative efficiency of 
market procedures as a means of redistributing land held in speculative monopolies vis-à-vis the nature 
of reallocated resources within the constraints imposed by liberal political constitutions and law. In the 
context of extreme racial enmity and the absence of state finances to peacefully acquire lands, during 
political and economic crisis periods, it is not unusual that communities have been mobilised to 
physically occupy land by diverse political interests, (South Africa, Kenya, etc), and even co-opted by 
the ruling parties or state (e.g. in Zimbabwe since 2000). 
 
Other methods of resource redistribution which have been attempted in Africa during the 1960s and 
1970s, include the nationalisation  of large industries, banks and commercial enterprises and their 
conversion into parastatals for the general public benefit. This mechanism soon ran into the problem of 
inefficient management of patronage distribution, frequently on ethnic grounds. In the wake of the 
privatisation of such parastatals, the key problems have been their cheap sale to foreign interests and 
allegations that the new indigenous owners tend also to be corruptly selected, at times through ethnic 
patronage processes. 
5.2.5 Affirmative action: indigenisation and empowerment initiatives 
The reversal of past race based discrimination has perhaps been best attempted in the social sphere. For 
instance, education has been rigorously addressed in former settler colonial Africa, where blacks 
increasingly have the upper hand. For example in South Africa, “the change from apartheid to a 
democratic South Africa has brought about the transition from a racial and elite education to mass higher 
education in South Africa” (Kaya, 2000). [There is] … an increasing number of students in higher 
educational institutions, especially black students in the historically white universities. This is a 
challenge to the professoriate in these institutions because traditional curriculum frameworks must be 
adopted to serve a more comprehensive cohort of students with a wider set of concerns, to which some   64
universities are responding faster than others. The challenge of past neglect is found mostly “… in the 
historically black universities who ... had either no exposure to the use of computer facilities or due to 
financial constraints have no access to these facilities. In the historically white universities where 
students have access to internet facilities, the advent of Global Information challenges the traditional 
notions of teaching space by reducing the need for lecture halls and other infrastructure of the traditional 
university” (Ibid). 
 
Similarly the mining sector and large businesses have since 1994 been persuaded to allocate shares to 
indigenous blacks as a means of redressing racial imbalances in economic  wealth. While a few large 
black corporations have emerged out of affirmative action equity transfer in South Africa (e.g. NAIL, 
etc), these initiatives remain limited and the racial structures of wealth control and employment remains 
skewed. In recent times a new comprehensive programme of Black economic Employment (BEE) based 
upon equity sharing, race employment, gender and the allocation of state licenses, contracts and 
concessions has been launched in South Africa. This approach represents an attempted negotiated 
accommodation of the majoritarian elite interests by dominant white minority interests. Its results are yet 
to be seen. 
  
In addition to these two redistributive approaches, milder forms of resource reallocations have been 
attempted through affirmative action programmes. The most recent at this are found in South Africa. 
Black economic empowerment (BEE) in South Africa is a joint effort by the government and private 
companies to restructure apartheid’s unjust economic and resource control legacy. BEE represents one 
of the largest efforts of affirmative action intended to voluntary shift asset holdings in modern history, 
which builds on the South African government’s demonstrated skill of "... striking a balance between 
promoting social engineering and heeding the legitimate concerns of business" (Financial Times, 2003). 
It entails “broad-based women’s empowerment” and affirming the "historically disadvantaged 
individuals” of black, mixed-race coloured and Indian descent. Cyril Ramaphosa (Financial Times, 
2003) calls BEE “another revolution” following the negotiated political transition process that ended 
apartheid. “It’s not grab and run – it’s taking place in as orderly a way as our political transformation,” 
says Cyril Ramaphosa (Ibid). Given South Africa's highly unequal income, wealth and assets 
distribution, and the social exclusion, which it brings, social and economic inclusion of black people in 
the mainstream economy is intended to promote faster economic growth and enhanced political stability, 
and to pre-empt the perceived potential for populist redistribution, that Zimbabwe's land reform tinged 
by racial divisions took since 2000. 
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Black empowerment has however many contradictions, especially the creation of a few black economic 
oligarchs. The “BEE tycoons,” which entail about 10 men are favoured by white –owned businesses, are 
rapidly building up stakes in the mining, media and other industrial sectors (Ibid) and they exhibit 
monopolistic tendencies. But some critics suggest that BEE charters and related rules may over-regulate 
the economy and deter investment (Financial Times, 2003). For instance Sasol, (the chemicals and fuels 
group) cited BEE as a risk factor in its reports at the New York stock exchange (Ibid). South Africa's 
established industrial magnates however seek greater tax incentives to effect racial wealth 
transformation. Indeed the Democratic Alliance, a largely white-supported opposition party, has 
demanded that 2010 be set as the deadline for the BEE, while suggesting that: “BEE has lent itself to 
manipulation and abuse by well connected ANC cronies" (Ibid). Moelesti Mbeki argues that BEE 
enriches a few black people rather than South Africa’s economically disenfranchised masses, and 
accuses white- controlled companies of taking the path of least resistance on BEE by swapping equity 
control or board seats for political connections. “The oligarchies are now trying to deracialise their club 
by buying black members into their oligarchies,” ... (Financial Times, 2003). 
 
BEE reverses South Africa’s former apartheid regime’s affirmative action aimed at increasing the 
economic participation of poor white Afrikaners. The new black-led government after 1994 introduced 
empowerment legislation such as procurement rules favouring black suppliers (Ibid). Many policy 
makers feel that the BEE processes have not gone far enough, although since 2000, South Africa saw its 
first “voluntary” sectoral BEE charter, (in the liquid fuels industry), in which companies, including 
foreigners, have to transfer at least 25 % of their equity to black owners within 10 years. The BEE 
charter for the mining sector, which was approved in 2003, requires companies to cede 15 per cent of 
ownership to “historically disadvantaged” South Africans within five years and 26 per cent within 10 
years. Some investors see this as a gradual nationalization process, there has been a tendency for shares 
to be sold in a panic, leading to share declines as companies scramble to meet the requirements 
(Financial Times, 2003). 
 
The moral and the economic rationale behind BEE is that it brings more black people into the formal 
economy and can as leads to a bigger consumer market, more jobs and investment. Its critics say BEE 
encourages tokenism and suppresses genuine entrepreneurship, while keeping the bulk of South Africa’s 
economy in white hands. White's still dominate most companies’ senior management and black-
controlled companies account for only about 3 per cent of the JSE Securities Exchange’s capitalization 
(Ibid). According to the BusinessMap Foundation, a Johannesburg Research Institute “It is quite easy for   66
any white company to abide by the legislation and still not comply with the spirit of BEE.” (Financial 
Times, 2003)  
 
South Africa’s black “new rich” are however insignificant compared to the white industrial elites since 
according to Mr. Macozoma (Financial Times, 2003) only five black people in the country have assets 
worth more than R100 million. Yet BEE supporters argue that it was not designed for poverty–relief 
scheme, and that South Africa’s government is addressing unemployment, hunger, poverty and unequal 
access to education through other programmes. While BEE focuses on black equity control and 
encourages preferential procurement measures which involve many black people, it seeks to increase 
black managers in business and promotes training and the provision of services to poorer communities. 
The BEE policy is also backed by other policies such as the employment equity regulations (Kemp, 
2002), which govern, employers with 50% or more employees; Employers with a turnover threshold as 
stipulated in schedule 4 of the employment Equity Act; Municipalities and organs of state and any 
employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of 23 and 31 of the Labour Relations Act. 
Companies with more than 150 employees are required to submit annual empowerment equity reports 
each year and those with less than 150 employees submit a report every 2 years (Kemp, 2002). 
 
The weakest link for BEE is that whites hold 75% of South Africa's top management positions, 
compared to 8% for blacks, 13% for the "coloureds" and 4% for Indians. Added to this blacks do not 
have capital to engage in BEE "deals". Doing empowerment deals is complicated according to Manning 
(Ibid): “often the people who come into the deals do not have the capital that they need, or the skills 
necessary." Low levels of black education means that there are not enough highly skilled black people to 
fill all the empowerment positions. The full effects of BEE are yet to be seen. 
6.0 Conclusions: summary of findings and lessons 
This paper has argued that socio-economic dominance based on ethnic and race factors has become a 
long standing phenomena in Africa, which was instigated by colonial rule and perpetuated by elite 
interests in capital accumulation and political power during the post-colonial era. Weak economic 
performance in general, dependence on the state for basic social and economic resource accumulation 
and social services, the over-reliance on agricultural resources (land, water, etc) for livelihoods, and 
negative external transfers, have tended to focus ethnic dominance building strategies on limited 
resources, restricting the scope for resource sharing and improving livelihoods. Political power through 
the state has been a key instrument of exclusion, and its maintenance has been sought through extreme   67
measures, including war. External interests have fomented these dominance building process. Limited 
success has been achieved in redressing imbalances.   68
7.0 References 
1 Upinfo, 2003. www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/sout-africa/south-africa67.htm 
Africa Overview Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, 1999. http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/ 
Agyeman, D. K. 1998. “Ethnic Conflicts and Politics in Ghana.” In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. Ethnic 
Conflicts in Africa. Dakar, Senegal. p.183-204. 
BBC News. Ethnic tension sparks Ethiopian defection. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1490533.stm 
Bigazaza, J., Abong, C. and Mukarubuga, C. 2002. “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in 
Rwanda.” In Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of 
Africa’s Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, South Africa. p.50-82. 
Casaburri, I. 1988 “On the Question of Women in South Africa.” In Magubane B and I Mandaza, eds. 
Whither South Africa. South Africa. p 157-160.  
CIA-The World Factbook. Liberia, Mali, Sudan, Angola, Zimbabwe. 
www.odi.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ 
Country Profile, South Africa. http://www.enn.com/worldinfo/south africa.htm. 
Davnie, Hasler; Numara and Spencer, 1996 internet referenced 
Delville, P.L, 1999. Harmonising formal law and customary land rights in French-speaking West Africa, 
International Institute for Environment and Development (iied) issue paper no. 86. 
Egwu, S. G. 1998. “Agrarian Question and Rural Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria.” In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. 
Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar, Senegal. p 53-78. 
Eller and Coughlan, 1993 internet referenced 
Ethno-Net Africa Database: Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Ghana, Gabon, Zambia, Chad, Nigeria and South Africa. . www.ethnonet-
africa.org/data/ 
Factmonster World and News. Burundi. www.factmonster.com/ipka/A0107374.html 
Farah, I., Hussein, A and Lind, J 2002. “Deegaan, Politics and War in Somalia.” In Jeremy Lind and 
Kathryn Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, 
South Africa Scarcity and Surfeit. p 321-356. 
Financial Times. Wednesday 5 November, 2003. Comment and Analysis. South Africa’s “cappuccino 
effect”: will economic empowerment do more than create a sprinkling of black tycoons?, p 11. 
Flintan, F and Tamrat, I. 2002. “Spilling Blood over Water? The Case of Ethiopia” In Jeremy Lind and 
Kathryn Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, 
South Africa. p 243-319. 
Food and Agriculture Organisation. FAOSTAT Database Results. www.fao.org 
Giliomme, 1998 “The beginning of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850-1915.” In Leroy vail, ed. The 
Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. p 21-55. 
Goldin, I. 1989. “Coloured identity and Coloured Politics in the Western Cape Region of South Africa.” 
In Leroy Vail, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. alk paper. South Africa. p’324-
349. 
Goldsmith, P., Abura, L and Switzer, J. 2002. “Oil and Water in Sudan.” In Jeremy Lind and Kathryn 
Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, South 
Africa. p. 187-229. 
Goldsmith, P., Abura, L. A. and Switzer, J. 2002. “Oil and Water in Sudan.” In Jeremy Lind and 
Kathryn Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, 
South Africa. p 187-241. 
Gonnin, G. 1998. “Ethnicity, Politics and National Awareness in Cote d’Ivore.” In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. 
Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar, Senegal p.159-181   69
http://www.enn.com/news/2003-03-19/s_3453. 
Jewessiewick, B. 1989. “The Formation of Political Culture of Ethnicity in the Belgian Congo.” In 
Leroy Vail, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. alk paper, South Africa. p 241-
254. 
Kaya, O. 2000. “Black and White Universities in South Africa: The Challenges of change.” In Ahmed I 
and Kane O, eds. Identity, Culture and Politics in South Africa. p 89-97. 
Keller, E.J. 2002. Culture, Politics and the Transnationalization of Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Polis / 
R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. Vol. 9, Numéro Spécial. 
Lumumba, O and Kanyinga, K. 2003. The Land Question and Sustainable Development in Kenya. Draft 
paper for the Regional Land And World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Dialogue 
Initiative: An African Perspective on Land and Sustainable Development. 
Lumumba, O. 2003. The Land and Sustainable Development in East Africa. Draft paper for the 
Regional Land And World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Dialogue Initiative: 
An African Perspective on Land and Sustainable Development. 
Magasela, 2001 internet referenced 
Mail & Guardian, 2001 internet referenced 
Marks, S. 1989. “Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu ethnic 
Consciousness.” In Leroy Vail, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. alk paper, 
South Africa.  
Molomo, M.G. 2003. The land Question and Sustainable Development in Botswana,. Draft paper for the 
Regional Land And World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Dialogue Initiative: 
An African Perspective on Land and Sustainable Development.  
Morgan, W. T. W. 1992. “Tropical African Colonial Experience.” In Tropical African Development. 
New York London, p.25-92. 
Moyo, S. 2003. The Land Reform and Land Distribution in Southern Africa (es), Paper presented on 
“Interrogating Development Policy”, hosted by the Central Policy Unit, Kwazulu Natal, South 
Africa Paper. 
Moyroud, C and Katanga, J. 2002. “Coltan exploration in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.” 
In Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s 
Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, South Africa. p 159-181. 
Moyroud, C and Katunga, J. 2002. “Coltan Exploration in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).” In Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, eds. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of 
Africa’s Conflicts. ISS, Pretoria, South Africa. p 159-185. 
Natiomaster.com. Map & Graph; Africa; People; Ethnic groups (note). Namibia. 
www.nationmaster.com/garph-T/poe_eth_gro_not/AFR 
Nieuwmeijer and du Toit, 1994 internet referenced 
Nomura, N., Davnie, L., Formari, F., Hasler, A and Spencer, J. 1996. “Ethnic Conflicts between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi in Burundi.” 
www.earlham.edu/~pols/globalprobs/burundi/info.htmldemocracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Posner.
htm 
Osaghae, E. E. 1998. ‘The Ethnic and Class Character of Political Conflicts in Liberia.” In Okwudiba 
Nnoli, ed. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar, Senegal. p. 131-157. 
Otunnu and Laloyo, J. (no date). Accord Series “Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland.” 
www.cr~r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/theconflict.shtml,  
Oyugi, W. O. 1998. “Ethnic Politics in Kenya.” In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. 
Dakar, Senegal. p 287-309. 
p 215-240. 
Papstein, R. “From Ethnic Identity to Tribalism: the Upper Zambezi Region of Zambia.” In Leroy Vail, 
ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. alk paper, South Africa. p 372-394.   70
Peacenet-Kenya 2001. “Ethnic clashes in Kenya.” www.peacenet-Kenya.org/projects/ethniclashes.htm 
Posner, D. N. 2001. “Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa.” Workshop on Democracy in 
Africa in Comparative Perspective. Stanford University. 
www.democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Posner.htm  
Project proposal for a Comparative Research on Conflicts in Eastern Africa, Case Studies from Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda , submitted by development Policy Management 
Forum, 2003, p 20-33. 
Ranger, T. 1989. “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe.” 
In Leroy Vail, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. p 118-150. 
Rutake, P and Gahama, J. 1998. “Ethnic Conflict in Burundi.” In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. Ethnic Conflicts 
in Africa. Dakar, Senegal. p 80-103. 
Sawyer, A. 2003. Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: ‘The Case of the Mano 
River Basin Area’ Amos Sawyer Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Indiana 
University. http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/sawyer_022003.pdf.  
Sepdata, 2002. www.sepdata.virtue.net/s11.htm 
Sihlongonyane. F.S. 2003. Land Occupations in South Africa, p 8-10. Chapter for Reclaiming the Land: 
The resurgence of Rural Movement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, ed. By S Moyo and P 
Yeros, London: Zed Books, forthcoming. 
Sithole, M. 1998. “Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Zimbabwe.” In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. Ethnic Conflicts 
in Africa. Dakar, Senegal. p 351-378. 
Suliman, M. 1997. “Ethnicity from perception to causes of violent conflicts: The case of the Fur and 
Nuba conflicts in Western Sudan.” www.ifaanet.org/Th%20Inversion%20of%20Ethinicity.htm 
Twagiramutara, P. 1998. “Ethnicity and Genocide in Rwanda.” In Okwudiba Nnoli,ed. Ethnic Conflicts 
in Africa. Dakar, Senegal p.105-129 
Vail, L and White, L. 1989. “Tribalism in the Political History of Malawi.” In Leroy Vail the Creation 
of Tribalism in Southern Africa. Malawi. p 151-195. 
Van Binsbergen, W. M. J. 1997. “Ethnicity and Identity in South Central Africa.” 
www.shikanda.net/ethnicity/encyclop.htm  
World Resources Institute. World Resources 2000-2001. www.wri.org/ 




   71
8.0 Annexes 
Annex 1: Social services (Safe, water, sanitation, school enrolment, and literacy) 
Population with access 
to safe water (%) 
Population with access 



















































1985 1995 1985 1995 
Angola  22  46 31 27  62 40  34 25  28 34  1           
Botswana  88 100 90 41  91 55  83 78  91 86  6  47  68  78  64  73 
Burundi  49  92 52 50  60 51  33 38  14 20  1    25  38  49  55 
Cameroon  43  57 50 36  64 50  59 64  35 45  4    50  67  70  80 
Chad  17  48 24  7  73 21  35 61  10 26  1    17  31  34  49 
Congo  7  53 34     69  76 81  74 94  8    54  72  75  86 
DRC  26  89 42  6  53 18  48 69  29 46  2    31  47  59  71 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
32  56 42 17  71 39  50 66  24 45  5    21  36  41  53 
Eritrea  8  60 22  0  48 13  28 31  34 41  1  13  26  38  57  66 
Ethiopia  19  91 25  7  97 19  27 44  18 32  1  20  18  31  34  42 
Ghana  52  88  65  44  62  55          1   44 60 68 79 
Kenya  49  67 53 81  69 77  67 63  57 65  2    57  74  79  88 
Lesotho  57  91 62 35  56 38  74 63  80 66  2  54  88  93  64  71 
Liberia  13  79  46  4  56  30          3   25 34 55 67 
Malawi  40  95  47  1  18  3  100  97  54  91  1   36 44 68 73 
Mali  55  87  66  3  12  6  31  45  13  23  1  20 17 31 30 46 
Mozambique     63     54  34 45  17 28  1  24  16  27  47  58 
Namibia  71 100 83 20  93 62  94 89  84 77  9    71  80  76  82 
Nigeria  40  58  49  32  50  41          4   35 53 57 70 
Rwanda  79     85           1    44  57  63  72 
Senegal  44  90 63 15  71 39  54 65  16 24  3    17  26  37  45 
Sierra  Leone  21  58  34 8  17  11         2       
Somalia      26               2       
South  Africa  70  99 87 80  92 87  100  100  97 93      79  84  81  85 
Sudan      73      51          4   29 43 59 68 
Tanzania  58  92  66  83  98  86  49  48      1  20 48 64 75 83 
Uganda  41  77  46  55  75  57          2  33 41 54 68 76 
Zambia  10  84 38 57  94 71  72 73  35 49  3    56  69  77  84 
Zimbabwe  69  99 79 32  96 52  92 94  56 62  7  36  73  83  85  92 
Source: World resource Institute, 2000-2001   72
Annex 2: Ethnic populations by incomes, wealth and GDP breakdowns 
Real GDP per 
capita 
(PPP$) 











































Angola  9.4 .. .. ..  ..  ..  ..  0.54  .. 
Botswana 0.2  ..  ..  33.3  47.0  ..  ..  0.54  .. 
DRC  676.0 .. .. ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Lesotho ..  137  2,945  50.4  26.0  ..  ..  0.57  .. 
Malawi 1.3  ..  ..  42.1  54.0  ..  ..  0.62  .. 
Mali                
Mauritius  .. .. .. ..  10.6  ..  ..  0.52  .. 
Mozambique 0.2 .. .. ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Namibia  2.2 .. .. ..  ..  ..  ..  0.70  .. 
South Africa  22.6  516  9,897  11.5  ..  82  ..  0.59  48 
Swaziland  0.6 .. .. ..  66.0  ..  ..  0.51  .. 
Tanzania 498.7  217  1,430  19.9  51.1  52  52 0.38  70 
Zambia 131.1  216  2,797  72.6  86.0  75  75  0.50  75 























   73
 
Annex 3: Ethnic populations by incomes, wealth and GDP breakdowns 
National poverty lines  International poverty lines 
Population below the poverty 
line (%) 
Population below the poverty 
line (%) 
 
Country   Survey 
year 
Rural   Urban  National 
Survey 
year 
















gap at $2 
a day % 
Angola  1991  ..  ..  25.5  1993      17.6         
Botswana                1985-86  33.3  12.5  61.4  30.7 
Burundi  1990     36.2                  
Cameroon 1984  32.4  44.4  40.0                 
Chad  1995-96  67.0  63.0  64.0                 
Congo 
Republic 
                       
Cote  d’Ivoire                1995  12.3  2.4  49.4  16.8 
DRC                         
Eritrea                         
Ethiopia                1995  31.3  8.0  76.4  32.9 
Gabon                         
Ghana  1992  34.3  26.7  31.4                 
Kenya  1992  46.4  29.3  42.0        1994 26.5  9.0 62.3  27.5 
Lesotho  1993  53.9  27.8  49.2        1993 43.1  20.3 65.7  38.1 
Liberia                         
Malawi  1990-91     54.0                  
Mali                1994  72.8  37.4  90.6  60.5 
Mauritius                         
Mozambique                1996  37.9  12.0  18.4  36.8 
Namibia                1993  34.9  14.0  55.8  30.4 
Nigeria  1985 49.5  31.7  43.0  1992-93 36.4  30.4  34.1  1997  70.2  34.9  90.8  59.0 
Rwanda  1993     51.2         1983-85  35.1  7.7  84.6  36.7 
Sierra  Leone  1989  76.0  53.0  68.0        1989 57.0  39.5 74.5  51.8 
Somalia                         
South  Africa                1993  11.5  1.8  35.8  13.4 
Sudan                         
Swaziland                         
Tanzania                         
Uganda                         
Zambia  1991  88.0 46.0  68.0 1993   86.0   1996  72.6  37.7  91.7  61.2 
Zimbabwe  1990-91  31.0  10.0  25.5        1990-91 36.0  9.6 64.2  29.4 
Source: African Economic outlook, 2002.    74






























consumption (%)  
Lowest 10 % 
Highest 10 % 
Exports 
(%)* 
Angola             
Botswana 5,293 3,434 45.3  33.3      56.0 
Burundi             
Cameroon 8,879  597  64    42    16.1 
Chad 1,393  177 33.6        46.8 
Congo 
Republic 
            
Cote d’Ivoire  9,372  585  33.6  12.3  36.7  3.1   
28.8 
 
DRC             
Eritrea             
Ethiopia 6,303  100  45  31.3  40  3     
33.7 
16.7 
Gabon 5,025 4,085  62  23      64.7 
Ghana 5,102  264 42.6  38.8  39.6  2.4     
29.5 
60.9 
Kenya 10,372  338  52  26.5 44.5  1.8     
34.9 
26.5 
Lesotho             
Liberia             
Malawi             
Mali             
Mauritius 4,629 3,987          60.8 
Mozambique 3,812  208 69.4    39.6  2.5     
31.7 
13.1 
Namibia 3,435 1,955    34.9  70    50.0 
Nigeria 40,742  358  34.1  70.2 50.6  1.6     
40.8 
52.6 
Rwanda            29.1 
Sierra  Leone             
Somalia             
South Africa  125,887  2907    11.5  59.3  1.1   
45.9 
 
Sudan             
Swaziland             
Tanzania 9,074  258 51.5  19.9  38.2  2.8     
30.1 
14.1 
Uganda 6,206  266 35.2    37.4  3     
29.8 
10.1 
Zambia             
Zimbabwe 7,408  587 75.6  36  56.8  1.8     
46.9 
30.0 
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Overall Area  






(% of total 
land) 
Grazing Lands (% of 
total land) 
Angola 1,246,700  2  ..  43  23 
Botswana 600,370  2  20  2  75 
Burundi 27,830  43  720  2  35 
Cameroon 475,440  13  280  54  18 
Chad 1,284,000  2  100  11  36 
Congo 
Republic 
342,000 2  40  62  29 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
322,460 9  620  26  9 
DRC 2,345,410  3  100  78  4 
Ethiopia 1,119,683  12  1,620  24  41 
Eritrea         
Gabon 257,670  1  na  78  18 
Ghana 230,020  5  80  37  15 
Kenya 569,250  3  520  4  7 
Lesotho 30,350  10  na  0  66 
Liberia 96,320  1  20  39  2 
Malawi 94,080  25  200  50  20 
Mali 1.22 
million 
2 50  7  25 
Mauritius 1,850  54  170  31  4 
Mozambique 784,090  4  1,150  20  56 
Namibia 825,418  1  40  22  64 
Nigeria 910,770  31  8,650  15  23 
Rwanda 24,950  29  40  10  18 
Sierra Leone  71,620  25  340  29  31 
Somalia 627,340  2  1,600  14  46 
South Africa  1,219,912  10  11,280  3  65 
Sudan        
Swaziland          
Tanzania 886,040  5  1,530  47  40 
Uganda 199,710  23  90  30  25 
Zambia 740,720  7  320  27  47 
Zimbabwe 386,670  7,25  2,250  49  12,5 
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Lands Sq km 






   
Angola 124,670  3,000  0.25  75  1,170,651   
Botswana 56,673 370  0.22  1 525,600   
Burundi  2,568  900   74   
Cameroon  46,540  5,960   33   
Chad  125,920  3,600   20   
Congo 
Republic 
34,150  175   1   
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
31,800  3,100   73   
DRC  226,705  6,700  0.14  11   
Ethiopia  100,000  10,712   190   
Eritrea  10,100  500   21   
Gabon  25,767  325   15   
Ghana  22,754  3,700   11   
Kenya  56,914  4,600   87   
Lesotho 3,035  330  0.16  1  160   
Malawi 9,408  2,200 0.18  30  46,510   
Mali  122,019  4,660   138   
Mauritius  203  100  0.08  22   
Mozambique 78,409  4,000  0.17  107  581,350   
Namibia 82,329  816  0.47  7  560,650   
Nigeria  91,077  28,500   233   
Rwanda  2,467  1,000   5   
Somalia  62,734  1,045   200   
South Africa  121,991.2    0.28    45,150   
Sudan  237,600  16,233   1,950   
Swaziland 1,720 178  0.18  70  5,996   
Tanzania 88,359  4,000  0.12  170  599,400   
Uganda  19,710  5,100   9   
Zambia 74,339  5,260  0.55  46  676,067   
Zimbabwe 38,685  3,220  0.24  117  233,900  48,333.75 
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Annex 7: Land and natural resources (water, forests, minerals)  
Country   Resources  Export  
Angola Oil,  Diamonds,  Petroleum,  Iron ore, Phosphates, Copper, 
Feldspar, Gold, Bauxite, Uranium 
Crude oil, Diamonds, Refined petroleum products, 
Gas, Coffee, Sisal, Fish, Fish products, Timber, 
Cotton  
Botswana  Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Soda ash, Meat, Textiles  Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Soda ash, Meat, 
Textiles 
Burundi  Nickel, Uranium, Rare earth oxides, Peat, Cobalt, Copper, 
Platinum, Vanadium, Arable land , Hydropower 
Coffee, Tea, Sugar, Cotton, Hides 
Cameroon  Oil, Bauxite, Iron ore, Timber, Hydropower  Petroleum products, Lumber, Cocoa beans, 
Aluminium, Coffee, Cotton 
Chad  Oil, Uranium, Natrona, Kaolin, Fish  Cotton, cattle, Textiles, Fish 
Congo Republic  Oil, Timber, Potash, Lead, Zinc, Uranium, Copper, 
Phosphates, Natural gas 
Crude oil, Lumber, Plywood, Sugar, Cocoa, 
Coffee, Diamonds 
Cote d’Ivoire  Oil, Diamonds, Manganese, Iron ore, Cobalt, Bauxite, copper  Cocoa, Coffee, Tropical woods, Cotton 
Petroleum,, Banana, Pine apples, Palm oil 
DRC  Diamonds, Cobalt, Copper, Cadmium, Oil, Industrial and gem 
diamonds, Gold, Silver, Zinc, Manganese, Tin, Fermium, 
Uranium, Bauxite, Iron ore, Coal, Hydropower 
Diamonds, Copper, Coffee, Cobalt, Crude oil 
Eritrea    
Ethiopia  Gold, Platinum, Copper, Potash  Coffee, Leather products, Gold 
Gabon  Oil, Manganese, Uranium, Gold, Timber, Iron ore  Crude oil, Timber, Manganese, Uranium 
Ghana  Gold, Timber, Industrial diamonds, Bauxite, Manganese, Fish, 
Rubber 
Cocoa, Gold, Timber, Tuna, Bauxite, Uranium 
Kenya  Oil, Gold, Limestone, Soda ash, Salt barytes, Rubies, 
Flourspar, Garnets, Wildlife 
Tea, Coffee, Petroleum products 
Lesotho Water,  Agricultural  and grazing land, Diamonds, other 
minerals 
Wool, Mohair, Wheat, Cattle, Peas, Beans, Corn, 
Hides, Skins, Baskets 
Liberia  Iron ore, Timber, Diamonds, Gold, Hydropower  Rubber, Timber, Iron, Diamonds, Cocoa, Coffee 
Malawi  Limestone, Uranium, Coal, Bauxite  Tobacco, Tea, Sugar, Coffee, Peanuts, Wood 
products 
Mali  Gold, Phosphates, Kaolin,  Salt, Limestone, Uranium, 
Hydropower,  Bauxite,  Iron, ore, Manganese, Tin,  Copper  
Gold, Livestock, Cotton 
Mauritius  Arable land , Fish  Textiles, Sugar, Light manufactures 
Mozambique  Coal, Titanium  Shrimp, Cashew, cotton, Sugar, Copra, Citrus 
Namibia  Diamonds, Copper, Uranium, Gold, Lead, Tin, Lithium, 
Cadmium, Zinc, Salt, Vanadium, Natural gas, Fish, suspected 
deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore 
Diamonds, Copper, Gold, Zinc, Lead, Uranium, 
Cattle, Processed fish, Karakul skins 
Nigeria  Oil, Tin, Columbite, Iron ore, Coal, Limestone, Lead, Zinc, 
Natural gas 
Oil, Cocoa, Rubber 
Rwanda  Gold, Cassiterite (tin ore), Wolframite (Tungsten ore), Natural 
gas, Hydropower 
Coffee, Tea, Cassiterite, Wolframite, Pyrethrum 
Sierra Leone  Diamonds, Titanium ore, Bauxite, Iron ore, Chromite  Rutile, Bauxite, Diamonds, Coffee, Cocoa, Fish 
Somalia  Uranium, Iron ore, Tin, Gypsum, Bauxite, Copper, Salt  Bananas, Animals, Fish, Hides 
South Africa  Diamonds, Gold, Chromium, Antimony, Coal, Iron ore, 
Manganese, Nickel, Phosphates, Tin, Uranium, Platinum, 
Copper, Vanadium, Salt, Natural gas 
Diamonds, Gold, other minerals and metals, 
chemicals, food 
Sudan  Petroleum, Iron ore, Copper, Chromium ore, Zinc, Tungsten, 
Mica, Silver, Gold, Hydropower 
Oil and petroleum products, Cotton, Sesame, 
Livestock, Groundnuts, Gum Arabic sugar 
Tanzania  Hydropower, Tin, Phosphates, Iron ore, Coal, Diamonds, 
Gemstones, Gold, Natural gas, Nickel 
Coffee, Tea, Cotton, Tobacco, Cashew nuts, Sisal 
Uganda Copper,  Cobalt,  Limestone, Salt  Coffee, Tea, Cotton 
Zambia  Copper, Gold, Cobalt, Zinc, Lead, Coal, Emeralds, Silver, 
Uranium, Hydropower 
Copper, Zinc, Cobalt, Lead, Tobacco 
Zimbabwe  Coal, Gold, Tin, Chromium ore, Copper, Iron ore, Vanadium, 
Lithium, 
 Platinum,  nickel, Phosphates, Asbestos,  
Gold, Platinum, ferrochrome, tobacco, textiles,  
Source: CIA World Factbook, 1995 